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Introduction
Across much of the world, house prices have fluctuated substantially in the past 30 years, seemingly in connection
with the wider macroeconomy. Accordingly, the effect of house price shocks on aggregate consumption has been
extensively researched.1 Yet given that housing wealth and home ownership are unevenly distributed, it seems
important to ask not only how house price shocks affect mean consumption, but also how they affect consumption
inequality. I contribute to the literature on house prices and consumption by addressing this question.
Of course, an extensive literature has examined how house prices affect consumption across different groups.
These groups include age and housing tenure (for example, Li and Yao, 2007) and, perhaps most saliently, region
(for example, Mian, Rao, and Sufi, 2013). Nevertheless, in this paper I find that the effect of house prices shocks
on inequality is both starker and richer. I show that even a common house price shock affects inequality within
groups defined by age, education and region. This within-group measure of inequality is important because it
explains the bulk of total inequality.2 Specifically I find that a positive common house price shock generally
causes such consumption inequality to increase.
This paper therefore builds on two literatures. First, on that assessing the effect of house prices on consumption.
Second, on that explaining the evolution of consumption inequality. This second literature has typically focused
on the relationship between consumption inequality and income inequality, and particularly the role of shocks
from the labour market.3 I contribute to this second literature by exploring the role of shocks to asset prices:
in this case house prices.
I organize the analysis around a relatively standard partial equilibrium model of household choices over (non-
housing) consumption, housing tenure and housing size in an incomplete-market setting. This benchmark model
includes exogenous aggregate house price shocks, idiosyncratic income shocks, transactions costs and borrowing
restrictions determined by collateral constraints.
I use this framework to make three specific contributions. First I provide an analytic characterization of how
house price shocks affect consumption inequality. To do this, I simplify the benchmark model by abstracting
from transactions costs and collateral constraints. I also use inequality measures which decompose appropriately:
these are the variance-of-the-logarithm measure, and associated covariances, as used since Deaton and Paxson
(1994). By simplifying the benchmark model, and then by approximating the shock to consumption in terms
of the house-price and labour-market shocks, I track how house price shocks, in particular, drive the inequality
measures. More precisely, I decompose the consumption response to a house price shock into three factors: an
1For an early literature using similar data to that used here, see Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton,
and Leicester (2009) for the UK and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) for the US. See also the literature discussed below in the
dedicated literature review.
2On within-group inequality in labour earnings, the literature is vast. It has focussed in particular on the inequality ‘boom’
in the 1980s. Perhaps most relevant in the present context is Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002). For consumption inequality, see for
example Cutler and Katz (1992), Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and Aguiar and Bils (2015).
Meyer and Sullivan (2017) provide a wide ranging overview of inequality trends in both income and consumption in the U.S since
the 1960s. They informally discuss the role of asset prices in the joint evolution of these inequality measures.
3In addition to those papers focusing more explicitly on the inequality boom in the 1980s, see also Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004), Krueger and Perri (2005), Blundell, Low, and Preston (2013), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016).
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income effect, a substitution effect, and an endowment/wealth effect.4 As such, my decomposition relates to that
in Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra (2018), who derive an interpretable sufficient statistics formula for
the approximate effect of house price shocks on consumption. My formula is similar to theirs, but is more easily
used to study heterogeneity and inequality movements, because each component of my formula is observable at
the household level.
In terms of the three factors, I argue that consumption inequality is driven mainly by heterogeneity in the
endowment effect. This heterogeneity arises not only because of the division between owners and renters, but
also, importantly, because of dispersion in leverage. Ultimately, I express the effect of house price shocks on
inequality in terms of key statistics, which can be computed from cross-sectional micro-data. At the level of the
household, the key statistic is an endowment, or housing-wealth share: the proportion of gross housing wealth
in total life-time wealth. In terms of inequality movements, the key statistic is how this housing-wealth share
covaries with the consumption and income distributions. It is important to remember that, while inequality is
driven by the house price shocks, it is also, of course, driven by idiosyncratic shocks from the labour market.
This is the first paper, therefore, to characterize how these shocks affect consumption inequality in combination.
By simplifying the model I am able to derive this analytic characterization. However, this characterization comes
at the cost of abstracting from important features of the housing and mortgage markets, such as collateral
constraints. I therefore test the accuracy of my approximations by solving the full benchmark model and
disciplining it using UK data. I show that the approximations driven by a housing wealth effect are close to the
true house price elasticity, and that the approximations pick up variation in the true elasticity well in several
dimensions.
My second contribution is to apply the framework quantitatively to observed movements in inequality. I examine
the UK from the late 1980s until the financial crisis around 2008. This is a suitable period for the application.
House prices displayed large swings: a large decline in the early 1990s followed by a boom of unprecedented
length. Over this period the labour market was also comparatively stable.5 More practically, during this period,
detailed data are available on household wealth in 1995, 2000 and 2005 from the British Household Panel Survey.
This dataset also contains data on incomes and on food consumption. My headline inequality measures come
from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which has detailed cross-sectional data on incomes and on broad
expenditures.6
I first show that the approximated model is highly consistent with broad movements in the data. Specifically,
I analyse fixed groups of households given by decade-of-birth cohorts. As discussed, the inequality movements
depend most importantly on how the housing-wealth share is distributed. The data show that, for each group,
this share is positively correlated with consumption, and increasingly so over time. Because of this positive
4Following a house price increase, the income effect captures the result of the reduction in real life-time resources owing to the
increase in cost of housing services; the substitution effect captures the shift away from housing services holding fixed life-time
utility; the endowment effect captures the pure wealth effect from the increase in value of housing assets.
5The UK experienced a mild recession in the early 1990s during which the unemployment rate rose by 3 percentage points to a
little over 10%. Thereafter unemployment declined and stayed below 6% from 1999 onwards. On the other hand, inequality was
also influenced by redistributive reforms beginning in 1997. These reforms do not affect the present analysis. See Etheridge (2013),
an earlier working paper version of the current study, for a fuller discussion.
6As is relatively standard in the literature, I drop the distinction between consumption and expenditure in this paper.
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correlation, the model implies that house price increases should cause the gap between consumption inequality
and other measures to grow. Similarly, house price declines should cause the gap to fall. For both the groups I
study, this gap fell in the 1990s when house prices declined and grew strongly thereafter, consistently with the
model.
I then quantify these movements, first using the wealth share approximation. Focussing on the peak years of
the house price boom over 1997-2004, the gap between consumption inequality and the other measures grew
by 4.1 log points for the 1950s cohort and by 5.8 log points for the 1960s.7 These are large changes compared
with previous inequality movements. By computing the statistics described above, I show the simplified model
explains around 50% of the observed gap for the 1950s cohort, although for the 1960s cohort the model explains
less. A key strength of my approach, here, is that I can impose the cross-sectional distributions of the relevant
variables into the calculations directly.
I then extend this analysis by examining the role of several additional features, most importantly collateral
effects.8 To this end I use the full benchmark model’s non-linear solution, and measure the strength of collat-
eral constraints at the household level using housing leverage. I use the model to compute a simulation-based
consumption elasticity which I can then take to the data. Qualitatively and empirically, I find that leverage
covaries positively with the income and consumption distributions. Therefore the housing wealth and collateral
channels work in the same direction: Through both channels, a positive house price shock causes consump-
tion inequality to increase. Quantitatively, collateral effects are less important in driving inequality because
households with high leverage do not tend to lie at the extremes of the consumption distribution.
My third and final contribution is to assess how accounting for house price shocks affects estimates of income
risks. As discussed above, researchers have used the cross-sectional distributions of income and consumption to
quantify risks and risk sharing at least since since Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Blundell and Preston (1998).
In my model, ignoring house price increases causes estimates of the variance of permanent income shocks to
be biased upwards. This is because the researcher mis-attributes growth in consumption inequality to income
shocks rather than to shocks from asset prices. Likewise, I find that accounting for the house price declines in
the first part of the sample period increases the estimated variance of permanent shocks during the recession in
the early-1990s.
This paper proceeds as follows. I first provide a dedicated discussion of the literature on housing, which
has recently developed rapidly. Section 1 presents the benchmark model. I discuss the simplified model’s
approximated solution and its solution for the effect of house price shocks on inequality measures in section
2. I discuss the various sources of data in Section 3, where I also discuss the method used to estimate income
risks. Section 4 presents the primary results based on housing wealth shares. I examine the accuracy of the
wealth-share approximations in section 5, where I also extend the quantitative analysis to include collateral
effects, and two additional features: a time-varying rent-price ratio and an elasticity of substitution between
consumption and housing that differs from 1. Section 6 includes estimates of income risk, while section 7
7In other words, the house price increases caused the variance-of-log measure to increase by 0.058 for the 1960s cohort. I use the
term ‘log points’ similarly throughout the paper.
8The collateral effect captures the result of relaxing or tightening borrowing constraints, holding house prices fixed.
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concludes. A lengthy online appendix contains detailed derivations, discussion of the model’s non-linear solution,
and additional results. In particular, appendix C extends the theoretical framework to allow for the presence
of shocks to aggregate income, and provides a general equilibrium interpretation.
Literature Review
In terms of house prices and consumption my paper is closest to Berger et al. (2018). As discussed, they derive
an interpretable sufficient statistics formula for the approximate effect of house price shocks on consumption,
which can be taken to micro-data. My formula is different from theirs but contains important similarities,
which I discuss in detail in section 2. Briefly, although my formula is a less close approximation to the con-
sumption elasticity than theirs, it can be used in the present context more easily. Specifically, implementing
their formula requires calculating marginal propensities to consume out of transitory income, at the household
level. Calculating household-specific 𝑀𝑃𝐶s is infeasible with survey data. My formulae, on the other hand,
can be implemented easily with data on income, consumption and wealth. Moreover, when using the simulation
approach, I am able to build on my baseline approximations to account for some of the additional features that
they include, in particular collateral effects.
Aside from Berger et al., the literature on house prices and consumption has expanded rapidly. Progress has
been made both on empirical, and on more theoretical and quantitative grounds.
On the empirical side, much of the earlier literature on house price elasticities focused on UK data, in part
because of the importance of housing wealth in household portfolios in the UK. Examples include Attanasio
et al. (2009), Disney, Gathergood, and Henley (2010) and Campbell and Cocco (2007), who find the largest
elasticities. Using US data both Cooper (2013) and Aladangady (2017) find sizeable elasticities, and argue that
these effects are driven by those with high leverage, implying an important role for collateral effects. Relative
to these empirical estimates it is worth emphasizing that my results do not require the consumption elasticity
to be large on average. My focus, instead, is on how this elasticity varies across the population. Nevertheless
my quantitative analysis does imply a larger importance of wealth over collateral effects.
More recently the literature has turned to administrative data on broader measures indicative of household
consumption, such as automobile sales, credit card expenditure, and mortgage deals. Much of this work is
surveyed by Mian and Sufi (2016), alongside other lines of research.9 In influential contributions among this
strand, Mian and Sufi (2011) argue that US households boosted their consumption before the financial crisis
by extracting home equity. Mian et al. (2013) then argue that the distribution of housing wealth and leverage
explain differential declines in consumption across US locations during the great recession. The literature has
since proceeded to explore in detail how the relationship between housing and consumption is mediated by
various features of mortgage contracts: Bhutta and Keys (2016) compare the effects of interest rate changes
versus house price changes on equity extraction, while Ganong and Noel (2016) examine the effects of mortgage
debt forgiveness. In this paper I abstract from detailed features of mortgage contracts, but, in section 5 in
9Also see Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) for a survey based on an asset-pricing perspective.
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particular, I embed the discussion within some of these recent results. Also relevant to the present study
on inequality, recent papers have emphasized that the expansion of mortgage availability in the boom in the
US, and subsequent delinquency during the bust, was seen evenly across the distribution of income and credit
scores. Papers in this strand are Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2016), Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen (2016)
and Albanesi, De Giorgi, and Nosal (2017).10 These papers are consistent with my results because I find that
leverage is, if anything, positively correlated with the income and consumption distributions in the UK.
On the quantitative side, the present paper is most similar to those using partial equilibrium models, such
as Li and Yao (2007), Li, Liu, Yang, and Yao (2016) and Dı́az and Luengo-Prado (2010), who focus on the
distribution of wealth, in an infinite horizon setting. I use a model in this class to assess the life-cycle evolution
of consumption inequality. More recently the literature has seen the development of several general equilibrium
models. In many of these models house prices are driven by changes to credit conditions (Garriga, Manuelli,
and Peralta-Alva, 2017; Midrigan and Philippon, 2011; Huo and Ŕıos-Rull, 2016; Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van
Nieuwerburgh, 2017). Typically in these models, consumption is then driven by a combination of the changes to
credit conditions directly, and indirectly through the subsequent changes to house prices. A crucial component
to the quantitative relevance of these models is correctly capturing the dispersion in various asset and debt
positions. Focussing on this heterogeneity more explicitly, but without modeling housing, Krueger, Mitman,
and Perri (2016) review evidence from the PSID on the role of the distribution of income, consumption, assets
and debt in aggregate fluctuations. Perhaps most relevantly to the current paper, Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante
(2017) establish a model which allows for shocks not only to credit conditions and to aggregate productivity, but
also to beliefs about future housing needs. In part because of their modeling of a rental market they find that
changes to credit conditions have little effect on house prices and on aggregate consumption. In their model
house prices and consumption are driven more by changes to beliefs. Given that their belief shock has little
direct effect on consumption, but works through the resulting effect on house prices, this shock works similarly
to the exogenous house price shock used here.11 Additionally, they find that house prices affect aggregate
consumption mainly through the wealth channel, rather than through relaxing or tightening constraints.
1 Theoretical Framework
In this section I specify a fairly standard model of non-housing consumption and housing choices with an
exogenous income process and house price risk.12 This benchmark model is rich enough to feature choices over
10Among other relevant studies using administrative data, Browning, Gørtz, and Leth-Petersen (2013) examine house price effects
directly using administrative panel data from Denmark.
11In related work Landvoigt (2017) uses a life-cycle model, and observed choices, to infer expectations about future house price
movements.
12For the rest of the paper I use the terms ‘consumption’ and ‘non-housing consumption’ interchangeably. The shorter version is
usually preferred for brevity.
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ownership and renting and to feature transactions costs in housing and collateral constraints.
1.1 Choices and Preferences
Households are born at time 𝑡 = 0, work until 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑤 and die at time 𝑡 = 𝑇 . At time 𝑡, household 𝑖 maximizes
expected lifetime utility by choosing a state-contingent plan for housing size, 𝐻𝑖𝑘, and another composite













where 𝛽 is a subjective rate of time preference, assumed to be common across households, 𝑢 () is the within-
period felicity function during life, 𝐵 () is a warm-glow bequest function and ?̃?𝑖𝑇+1 is the stock of wealth
bequeathed. I omit formalizing the contingency of 𝐶𝑖𝑘, 𝐻𝑖𝑘 and ?̃?𝑖𝑇+1 on the history of shocks here for brevity
of notation. In addition to the size or quality of housing, households can choose between renting and owning.
This tenure decision is addressed below.
I restrict preferences to be separable and homothetic across time. Within each period, preferences can be fully
general. For my main results, however, I require 𝑢 () to be homothetic across consumption and housing. This
intratemporal homotheticity restriction is common when modeling the demand for housing.1314 A suitable













where 𝜏 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing, 𝑎 captures the relative preference
for non-housing consumption and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constant and given by 1𝛾 . In





Cobb-Douglas preferences give the cleanest final results.
I ignore deterministic changes to consumption (due, for example, to the presence of children) for simplicity of
exposition. These could be re-introduced and would affect the anticipated gradient on consumption growth. In
an empirical application, this gradient can be netted out by the econometrician, using observations on household
size and other characteristics.









where Φ measures the strength of preferences for bequests versus within-life consumption.
13As is standard, I distinguish between inter -temporal and intra-temporal hometheticity. Preferences are inter -temporally ho-
mothetic if both rich and poor households allocate total expenditures in the same proportions across time. Preferences are intra-
temporally homethetic if both rich and poor households allocate expenditures across goods in the same proportion within time
periods.
14Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2010), for example, argue that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, using evidence on wages and house
prices across time and across US metropolitan statistical areas.
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1.2 House Price Process





where 𝜁𝐻𝑡 is the shock to (the log of) house prices, 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 , with E𝑡−1𝑒𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 = 1, and 𝜇 is a constant reflecting trend
house price increases.
This specification is simple, and arguably standard among related studies. Specifically, most studies treat house
prices as a random walk with drift.15 On the other hand, house prices have historically shown long swings
both up and down. Arguably, therefore, house prices could be modeled with richer dynamics.16 I justify the
simple specification, as usual, by noting that the random walk model is a suitable benchmark for asset prices.
Nevertheless, I empirically assess how house prices evolve in section 3.
My specification is perhaps less standard by imposing that house prices are common across all households, and
by neglecting more local changes. Many related studies, in contrast, use regional price movements for identifi-
cation.17 Of course, if house price shocks are heterogeneous then they are more likely to increase consumption
dispersion.18 My specification is therefore on the conservative side. Again, in section 3, I empirically assess
national versus more local price movements.
1.3 Constraints
The flow budget constraint for those renting at time 𝑡 is:
𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜒𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + (1− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿) 𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 (2)
The left hand side of equation 2 gives expenditures at time 𝑡. These expenditures comprise financial savings,
𝐴𝑖𝑡, consumption, 𝐶𝑖𝑡, and housing rent. Rent is determined by the time-invariant rent-price ratio, 𝜒, current
house price, 𝑝𝐻𝑡 , and house size, 𝐻𝑖𝑡. The right hand side of equation 2 shows time-𝑡 resources. These resources
comprise liquid savings from the previous period, 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, returned at the risk free interest rate, 𝑅, alongside net
income, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and housing wealth, 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1𝐻 𝑖𝑡−1, net of depreciation 𝛿, and sales costs 𝜅. 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 is an indicator of
ownership in time 𝑡− 1. Housing wealth, if it exists, is inherited from choices made at time 𝑡− 1 and re-valued
at time 𝑡 prices.
The flow budget constraint for those owning at time 𝑡 is:
𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
(︀
1− 1𝑑𝑖𝑡−1𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 ̸=𝐻𝑖𝑡 (𝜅)
)︀
(1− 𝛿) 𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 (3)
15See, for example, Campbell and Cocco (2007) in the context of the UK.
16See, for example, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), and references therein. More recently Guren (2018) provides a model of house
price momentum.
17Again, Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio et al. (2009) are examples in the UK setting.
18Of course, the truth of this statement depends on the correlation of house price shocks with other features of the distribution.
Heterogeneous house price shocks would increase consumption inequality if, for example, they are unforecastable from current
information and hence uncorrelated with income and wealth.
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Similarly to the constraint for renters, the left hand of equation 3 gives (gross) expenditures at time 𝑡, the right
hand side gives (gross) resources. The household does not pay transactions costs, 𝜅, if it stays in a house of the
same size, in which case the net expenditures on housing are given by depreciation, 𝛿𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝐻𝑖𝑡, only.
Finally, in the benchmark model, household borrowing is restricted by a collateral constraint:




A household can only borrow by owning a house and putting it up for collateral. Financial net borrowing
is limited by a downpayment or equity requirement Ξ. Of course, most houses are purchased with mortgage
financing. As discussed in the introduction, much of the recent literature has focussed on the intricacies of
mortgage contracts, and their role in mediating the link between house price shocks and consumption. Many of
these intricacies are apparent in the UK context. These include: counter-cyclical mortgage pricing, a counter-
cyclical rent-to-price ratio, long-term mortgage contracts, time-varying rules on mortgage initiation, and costly
re-financing. The model presented here abstracts from all these detailed features, but nevertheless generates
the key mechanism which can drive consumption: house price rises loosen borrowing restrictions while house
price declines tighten them. I return to some of these further features of mortgage contracts throughout the
paper, and especially in section 5.
Finally, bequeathed assets, ?̃?𝑖𝑇+1 are determined as follows:
?̃?𝑖𝑇+1 = 𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑇 + 𝑌𝑖𝑇 + (1− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿) 𝑝𝐻𝑇+1𝑑𝑖𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑇
1.4 Income Process
During working life, latent income evolves according to the following standard permanent-transitory process:
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑡 + ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (5)
ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ln𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (6)
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 captures cohort, age, education, and household size and 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑡 captures the deterministic forecastable
component of income depending on these factors. ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 is (log) permanent income, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the mean-zero per-
manent shock and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the mean-zero transitory process. The innovations are independent of one another and
independent across time. These innovations are allowed, however, to have variances that change over time.
These variances are estimated using cross-sectional moments, as discussed in section 3. I have the usual in-
terpretation that permanent shocks represent long-term productivity changes such as promotions or changes
in health status within the household, while transitory shocks represent bonuses, temporary lay-offs or other
short-term changes in hours of work. I could allow for more general and richer processes: For example the
transitory shocks could be modeled as an MA(1) process, as in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), but identification
of these lagged effects is weak with cross-sectional data. Similarly I could allow a more complex autoregressive
process on the permanent/persistent process. These additions would change the analysis little.
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1.5 Other Model Features
The retirement age is fixed. After retirement, households have access to a pension, which is riskless, and the
value of which is determined by final salary. Households die at a fixed age and face no mortality risk beforehand.
The recursive problem for the household is discussed in fuller detail in appendix D.
2 The Role of Wealth Effects in Consumption Inequality
The benchmark model just specified contains four key channels driving the relationship between house prices
and consumption: these are not only income and substitution effects, but, more importantly, wealth effects
and collateral effects. In this section I abstract from collateral effects and assess the role in consumption
inequality of the key remaining channel, the wealth effect. I do this by simplifying the benchmark model
and approximating its solution for the response of consumption to income and house price shocks. These
approximations offer two main advantages over solving the dynamic program fully. First I can show what the
model implies for inequality profiles transparently. Second, to quantify effects, I can impose the observed and
relevant distributions of consumption, wealth and income into the calculations directly. The main weakness of
the approach is that it abstracts from the potentially important non-linearities in consumption. I discuss this
trade-off below and further assess the role of collateral effects in particular in section 5.
To proceed, I consider the household at generic time 𝑡 and modify the benchmark model described above. Most
importantly I drop the collateral constraint given by equation 4. Without the collateral constraint, households
are limited only by their terminal condition on borrowing, and therefore have a natural borrowing constraint.
I also set transactions costs, 𝜅, to zero. Moreover I abstract from the household tenure decision. Accordingly a
household can arrive at time 𝑡 either as a renter or an owner, but as I argue below, the choice thereafter does
not affect consumption responses: for concreteness we could imagine that the household sells its house and rents
thereafter. I solve the approximated model fully in appendix A. Here I give an overview of the key ideas.
2.1 Expected Lifetime Budget Constraint
A key step in approximating the solution is examining the budget constraint in expectation over the whole
lifetime. This lifetime budget constraint also provides an intuitive guide to how heterogeneity in endowments
drives heterogeneity in consumption responses. For this reason I focus on deriving this constraint first.
I begin by generalizing constraints 2 and 3 into the following constraint defined for time 𝑘 = 𝑡, ..., 𝑇 :
𝐴𝑖𝑘 + 𝐶𝑖𝑘 + 𝛶𝑝
𝐻
𝑘 𝐻𝑖𝑘 = 𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑘−1 + 𝑌𝑖𝑘 + 𝑝
𝐻
𝑘 ?̃?𝑖𝑘 (7)
where ?̃?𝑖𝑘 is the housing endowment carried forward from time 𝑘 − 1 to time 𝑘 and is specified as follows:
?̃?𝑖𝑘 = Θ𝐻𝑖𝑘−1 for 𝑘 > 𝑡 (8)
?̃?𝑖𝑡 given
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Here Θ and 𝛶 are fixed constants, and 𝜅 has been set to 0. In the model of renting, then Θ = 0 and 𝛶 = 𝜒 ∈ [0, 1],
while the model of homeownership uses 𝛶 = 1 and Θ = 1− 𝛿. In appendix A I solve the model explicitly in the
case of homeownership, but much of the analysis follows for any choice of 𝛶 and Θ.19
Let 𝜌𝑖𝑇 be a sequence of shocks from time 𝑡 to time 𝑇 , with a subsequence of shocks from time 𝑡 until time 𝑘
given by 𝜌𝑖𝑘 (𝜌𝑖𝑇 ). Conditioning on any 𝜌𝑖𝑇 , we can sum discounted versions of equation 7 over time to obtain
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where, in addition to the notation defined previously 𝑞 = 1𝑅 is the price of a unit of the risk-free asset, and
𝑟𝐻𝑘 = 𝜍𝑘𝑝
𝐻
𝑘 is a generalised rental, or user, price of housing, with E𝑡𝜍𝑘 constant for all 𝑘 ≥ 𝑡. Note that,
precisely speaking, stochastic variables should be written as, for example, 𝐶𝑖𝑘 (𝜌𝑖𝑘 (𝜌𝑖𝑇 )). I remove the explicit
dependence in the equation to save space.
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)︀ = 𝑒𝜁𝐻𝑡 (10)
for 𝑘 = 𝑡, ..., 𝑇 , where
E𝑡(𝑝𝐻𝑘 )
E𝑡−1(𝑝𝐻𝑘 )
captures the time-𝑡 innovation to expected future house prices. These innovations
to prices are the crucial aspect for the solution for consumption given below. That the prices of housing services
display the same innovations for any choice of 𝛶 and Θ provides the rationale for leaving tenure decisions
implicit.20
Finally, to obtain an expected lifetime budget constraint I take expectations with respect to information set ℐ.
The information set ℐ can be specified quite generally, and could equal, for example, the set of all information
19Of course, the approximate solution may be more or less accurate given extreme choices of these parameters.
20In the case of compulsory homeownership, when 𝛶 = 1 and Θ = 1− 𝛿, then the prices imply that the household must purchase
a house in the final period at present cost 𝑞𝑇−𝑡𝑝𝐻𝑇 𝐻𝑖𝑇 . In this case, households would prefer to rent in the final period before
death, leaving open more resources for non-housing consumption. I could therefore reduce and rationalize the difference between
the renting and owning versions of the model further by assuming that homeowners are also able to rent in the final period.
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The left hand side of equation 11 captures lifetime expenditures, the right hand side captures lifetime resources.
The key point of this subsection is that, as given by the left hand side of equation 11, homeowners and renters
face a similar pattern of lifetime expenditures. The main difference between homeowners and renters is in
resources, as given by the right hand side. Homeowners have a valuable endowment of housing, whereas the
renters do not. In notation, the inherited housing endowment is 𝑝𝐻𝑡 (1− 𝛿)𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 for single-home owner-occupiers
and 0 for renters. More generally, if a household owns positive housing assets which differ from the housing
services they consume then, again, the housing endowment need not correspond exactly to 𝐻𝑖𝑡−1. This would
be the case, for example, if the household owns a second home.
Some further discussion of the refined model, and the lifetime budget constraints presented here. First, it is
worth emphasizing that all housing decisions here are frictionless. I re-introduce transactions costs in section 5.
Second, by encapsulating housing prices into a single 𝑟𝐻𝑡 I assume implicitly that the cost of housing is common
across tenure types. For example, I assume there is no cost premium on renting. Ensuring that expected housing
costs are common across types is equivalent to placing further restrictions on 𝛶 and Θ. However, in the standard
case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, homogenous across the population, the introduction of heterogeneous user
costs of housing would not affect the main result. I discuss this issue further in the next subsection.
Third, and on the same note, recall that the benchmark model imposes a constant rent-price ratio, a strong
assumption. In fact, both in the US and the UK, the rent-price ratio is counter-cyclical, to the extent that
assuming a constant rental price (and varying rent-price ratio) is likely as close to the data. (See Belfield,
Chandler, and Joyce (2015) for the UK.) For this reason I numerically explore an extended model with constant
rent prices in section 5, and show that the conclusions from the main analysis hold. Finally, notice I have
imposed that 𝐴𝑖𝑇 = 0. This is the solution to the household’s problem in the absence of bequests, and when
𝐴𝑖𝑇 ≥ 0 is a terminal condition on assets. Given the preferences described in equation 1, this is without loss of
generality. Preferences for bequests could be re-introduced without affecting the final result.21
2.2 Consumption Dynamics
I now approximate the solution to the refined model, adapting the approach used in, for example Blundell et al.
(2013). Specifically, the household maximizes lifetime utility subject to the sequence of constraints in equation
21In the current model household preferences between consumption and bequests are homothetic, therefore even in the presence
of a strong bequest motive the income elasticity on current consumption is 1. The results in this section would only be affected if
bequests are modelled as either a necessary, or, more realistically, a luxury good.
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7, and law of motion in equation 8. I simplify notation by using lower case letters 𝑐𝑖𝑡, ℎ𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 to capture the
log of consumption, housing and income net of effects from observable household characteristics. In appendix


























where 𝜆𝑖𝑡 is the marginal utility of wealth, 𝜐
𝜆
𝑖𝑡 is its innovation and Γ
𝜆
𝑖𝑡 is its predictable change, forecastable
at time 𝑡 − 1. 𝜇 is the predictable change to house prices, and 𝜁𝐻𝑡 is the innovation, as above. The other
parameters are the Frisch (or 𝜆-constant) elasticities. 𝜂𝑥,𝑝𝑦 is the elasticity of good 𝑥 with respect to price 𝑝
𝑦
of good 𝑦.22 These Frisch elasticities could, in general, vary by household, but here I omit the 𝑖 subscript for
brevity of notation.
Expression 12 implies that house price shocks affect consumption both by shocking marginal utility (through
𝜐𝜆𝑖𝑡) and by inducing pure substitution (Frisch) effects. Holding marginal utility fixed, a positive house price
shock, for example, induces a Frisch response towards non-housing consumption of 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 . On the other hand,
holding fixed this pure substitution effect, the resulting downwards shock to marginal utility causes consumption
to grow by 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 − 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐶 and housing to grow by 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐶 − 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 . These rates depend on the income elasticities
on preferences, and in general will differ. However, when preferences are CES, then these coefficients on the
marginal utility of wealth terms are identical and equal to − 1𝛾 . In this case, consumption and housing move in
parallel. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝛾, then determines, for example, how responsive consumption
and housing are to interest rate changes, and to what extent consumption risk lowers life-time utility.
A problem with expression 12 is that changes to marginal utility are unobservable. I therefore improve on it by
expressing marginal utility shocks in terms of the real shocks that households receive: shocks to house prices and
to income. I do this by approximating innovations to the income side of the expected lifetime budget constraint
given in equation 11. In appendix A I therefore show that, when preferences are intratemporally homothetic,
and focussing on changes to consumption:
Δ𝑐𝑖𝑡 ≈ Γ𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖𝑡(𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝜖𝑖𝑡) +
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where Γ𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a predictable component reflecting long-term shifts due to trend house-price increases, and saving
due to time preferences, interest rates and the precautionary motive. 𝜁𝐻𝑡 is the realized common shock to
house prices, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic permanent shock to income and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 the transitory shock to income. The
remaining terms capture the transmission of these shocks through to consumption: 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is an annuitization
factor capturing the contribution of time-𝑡 income to discounted expected future (or ‘lifetime’) wealth, and is
typically small; 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is the share of discounted expected future labour income (‘human capital wealth’) in lifetime
22The Frisch elasticity is defined as 𝜂𝑥,𝑝𝑦 ≡ − 𝑢?̃?𝑦𝑢𝑦𝑢𝐶𝐶𝑢𝐻𝐻−𝑢2𝐶𝐻
1
𝑥
> 0 for 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ {𝐶,𝐻}. ?̃? refers to the good other than 𝑥: for
example, if 𝑥 = 𝐶, then ?̃? = 𝐻.
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wealth, and 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 is the share of gross housing wealth in lifetime wealth at time 𝑡, given the housing stock
inherited from time 𝑡 − 1. In notation, 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 is approximately equal to 1Λ𝑖𝑡E𝑡−1𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 ?̃?𝑖𝑡 ≈ 1Λ𝑖𝑡 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡−1?̃?𝑖𝑡, where
lifetime wealth, Λ𝑖𝑡, corresponds roughly to the right hand side of equation 11: Λ𝑖𝑡 is approximately the sum of
current financial wealth, 𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 (which includes mortgage debt as a liability), expected gross housing wealth,




23 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the budget share of
housing in discounted expected future (‘lifetime’) expenditure, equalling 1−𝑎 in the Cobb-Douglas benchmark.
𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 and 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 are the Frisch elasticities described above. See appendix A for precise details of these terms.
For example the appendix shows that the approximations are made using geometric means for the expectations
rather than arithmetic. I wait until section 3 before discussing the empirical implementation.
Expression 13 warrants further interpretation. I focus first on the effect of the house price shock, 𝜁𝐻𝑡 . In
this homothetic case, the shock’s effect can be decomposed simply into endowment, income and substitution
components. These components bear similarities to a Slutsky-type decomposition in elasticity form. The
endowment effect is captured by 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1, the share of gross housing wealth in lifetime wealth. To interpret
this effect, suppose that the substitution and income effects cancel. Then a house price shock, 𝜁𝐻𝑡 , causes
consumption to grow proportionately to how much housing is owned. At one extreme, for example, suppose
that consumption and housing are financed purely by housing assets, with no labour income and no other
financial wealth. Then a positive 1% house price shock raises consumption by 1%. More generally, when labour
income and financial wealth are present, then the pure endowment effect on consumption is muted.
Of course, a positive house price shock also makes housing services more expensive, inducing a negative income
effect. Intuitively, this negative income effect is equivalent to the result of reducing all of labour income, financial
wealth and housing wealth in identical proportions. When preferences are homothetic, a 1% negative income
effect, for example, then reduces consumption by 1% also. In the present case, when the house price shock is 𝜁𝐻𝑡
then housing costs, ignoring behavioural changes, rise by 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 . Therefore the house price increase is equivalent
to reducing lifetime income by 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 and consumption drops accordingly.
Finally, a positive house price shock makes households substitute away from housing services. This substitution
effect is the product of the expected budget share of housing expenditures, 𝑠𝑖𝑡, with the sum of the house-
price Frisch elasticities, 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 + 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 . When preferences are CES, with elasticity of substitution 𝜏 , then
𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 +𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 = 𝜏 . Therefore, when 𝜏 > 1 the substitution effect dominates the income effect, while when 𝜏 < 1
the reverse is true. When preferences are Cobb-Douglas, with 𝜏 = 1, then the substitution and income effects
cancel. In this case, changes to consumption are driven ultimately by the endowment effect.
Aside from house price shocks, consumption changes are also determined by the shocks to income, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 and
𝜖𝑖𝑡. The effect of these shocks depends on the elasticities 𝜋𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝜋𝑖𝑡. This result is standard and discussed
in much further detail in, for example, Blundell et al. (2013), so I do not pursue it further here. As a final
point, in appendix A I derive an approximation for consumption growth for general 𝑢 (), without imposing
homotheticity. However, in that case the approximation is not so easily interpretable, and it cannot be used in
empirical applications without knowledge of the income elasticities on consumption and housing.
23Notice that the human capital wealth share, 𝜋𝑡, has a time 𝑡 subscript, while the housing wealth share 𝜓
𝐻
𝑡−1 has been given a
time-𝑡− 1 subscript. In fact all wealth shares are computed using asset and debt positions at time 𝑡− 1 and income summed from
time 𝑡 onwards.
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The decomposition in expression 13 bears similarities to that discussed by Berger et al.. They break down the
effect of house price gains into endowment, substitution and income effects plus collateral effects. Collateral
effects arise when a house price increase (decline) relaxes (tightens) borrowing restrictions. As discussed, I
cannot capture these effects in this Euler approach framework. The relevant question in my application is how
this collateral channel affects the inequality measures. I return to this issue in section 5.
2.3 The Effect of Income and House Price Shocks on Consumption and Income Moments
I now use expression 13 together with the income process specification to calculate how income and house price
shocks affect inequality measures. Broadly, and focussing on house prices, the effect of an aggregate shock
depends on the dispersion of each of 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑠
𝐻
𝑖𝑡 and 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 +𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 . Clearly 𝜓
𝐻
𝑖𝑡−1, the endowment share, is highly
unevenly distributed. This is not only because both renting and homeownership are common, but also because
of heterogeneity in extra housing assets and, more importantly, in leverage.
Before exploring this heterogeneity in endowments in detail, I consider the role of heterogeneity in the expected
budget share, 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 , and the Frisch elasticities, 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 + 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 . First, recall that when preferences are CES, then
the Frisch elasticities combine to equal 𝜏 , the elasticity of substitution. Therefore, as previously discussed, when
preferences are Cobb-Douglas, the terms in 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 and the Frisch elasticities disappear entirely. More generally,
with regard to the elasticity of substitution, the literature has produced various estimates of its mean that differ
in either direction from 1, but has little to say about heterogeneity. With regard to budget shares, 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 is equal
across households if, for example, preferences (including the consumption weight, 𝑎) are homogeneous, and the
price of housing services is common. Of course, 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 may be unevenly distributed if these conditions do not
apply, as well as for other reasons, such as housing adjustment costs.
However, overall, even when preferences are not Cobb-Douglas, then, as long as 𝜏 is close to 1, the budget share,
𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 , likely has a much lesser role on the heterogeneous impact of house price shocks than the endowment share
𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1. For this reason, and because 𝑠
𝐻
𝑖𝑡 is often difficult to measure empirically, I drop it from the main analysis
of inequality profiles from now on. However, I return to some of these issues in section 5, where I specifically
explore the effects of housing adjustment costs combined with 𝜏 ̸= 1.24
Concentrating on endowment heterogeneity, therefore, appendix B shows that the processes given by expressions
24Alongside that analysis, it is worth briefly considering another relevant channel: renters typically face a cost premium on their
housing services and have lower-than-average consumption. In this case, if consumption and housing are complements, with 𝜏 < 1,
then such heterogeneity in 𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡 would lead to consumption inequality growing following a house price increase. Of course, if 𝜏 > 1
then the effect is reversed.
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6 and 13 imply the following formulae for growth in inequality of income and consumption:
ΔVar(𝑦𝑡) ≈ Var(𝜈𝑡) + ΔVar(𝜖𝑡) (14)

















𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1)⏟  ⏞  
Contribution from housing
(16)
where I use the following notation: Var(𝑥𝑡) denotes the cross-sectional variance of variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡; Cov(𝑥𝑡, 𝑧𝑡)
similarly denotes the cross-sectional covariance of variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑖𝑡, and ?̄?𝑡 denotes the cross-sectional mean
of variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Finally I use 𝑦
𝑃
𝑖𝑡 ≡ ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 for the log of permanent income.
Clearly, changes to income inequality as given by expression 14 are determined solely by the income process. But
both the covariance of income and consumption and the variance of consumption given in expressions 15 and 16
are determined by income fluctuations and by house price shocks jointly. My main focus is on the contribution
of house price shocks, which I now discuss in detail. How house price shocks contribute to the covariance of
income and consumption in expression 15 is simplest to describe: these shocks induce changes in the covariance
only if the housing wealth share is correlated with the distribution of permanent incomes. This would happen
if, for example, those with higher permanent income have more housing wealth. In my set-up there is no reason
why the housing wealth share and the distribution of permanent incomes should be correlated. Of course, the
wealth share is likely positively correlated with the income distribution for other unmodelled reasons, such as
heterogeneous mortgage availability or uneven preferences for homeownership. Ultimately, I assess the size of
this correlation empirically.
More importantly, house price shocks also contribute to the consumption variance, as given in equation 16. This
contribution consists of two parts. First a positive house price shock can increase the consumption variance





a positive house price shock can cause an increase or decrease in the consumption variance depending on
whether or not the wealth share is positively correlated with the consumption distribution. To see how these
effects differ, imagine two distributions. First, if housing wealth is spread randomly across the consumption
distribution and roughly in proportion to households’ life-time wealth, then the wealth share is uncorrelated
with consumption and the house price shock induces just an orthogonal shock to the consumption distribution
of size (𝜁𝐻𝑡 )
2Var(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1). As a second, more realistic case, suppose the wealth share and household consumption
are correlated positively. This might be justified theoretically if households who receive good transitory shocks
accumulate sufficient funds to provide a downpayment on a home and can also afford higher consumption. Then
household consumption covaries positively with the wealth share too. In this case the positive shock increases




25In contrast, if the share of a generic type of wealth 𝜓𝑗𝑡 covaries negatively with the consumption distribution, then a positive




𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡−1) > (𝜁
𝑗
𝑡 )
2Var(𝜓𝑗𝑡 ). Such is the case with, for example, social security
(state pension) wealth. The share of life-time in pensions varies negatively with total life-time wealth, because of the redistributive
nature of the social security system. Therefore, a positive shock to such wealth, due to, say, an unexpected increase in generosity
would reduce consumption inequality.
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The contribution of income risks to movements in the inequality measures is discussed by Blundell et al. (2013).
Briefly, in their framework the consumption variance and the covariance measures are both largely driven by
the variances of permanent shocks (Var(𝜈𝑡)), so should move roughly in parallel. They move perfectly in parallel
when households have no assets (𝜋𝑡 = 1). More realistically, the first term on the right hand side of expression
16, ?̄?2𝑡 + Var (𝜋𝑡), is less than the first term on the right hand side of expression 15, ?̄?𝑡, and so permanent
income shocks induce consumption inequality to grow more slowly than the covariance.26 The contribution
from transitory shocks to both the consumption-based measures given in equations 15 and 16 is generally small.
2.4 Further Discussion and Relationship to Berger et al. (2018)
I obtained the formula in expression 13 by using an Euler equation approach. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the only way to obtain an expression for inequality changes that can be taken directly to standard micro-data.
Notice, however, that expression 13 takes a very simple form, which can also be viewed more generally. It states
that the change to log consumption is the sum of a predictable component and changes coming from income
shocks and from house price shocks, and that these latter components are the product of the raw shock times
the relevant elasticity.
Viewed more generally, therefore, we can use the formula:
Δ𝑐𝑖𝑡 ≈ Γ𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑃𝑖𝑡𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑇𝑖𝑡𝜖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝜁𝐻𝑡
where 𝜔𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the elasticity of consumption with respect to permanent income shocks, 𝜔
𝑇
𝑖𝑡 is the elasticity with
respect to transitory income shocks, and 𝜔𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the elasticity with respect to house price shocks. This house
price elasticity has been explored recently by Berger et al. (2018), within a general class of housing models,
encompassing the benchmark model I describe in section 1. In their simplest model, with no rental markets
and frictionless adjustment, and with Cobb-Douglas preferences, they show that the elasticity of consumption




where ?̃?𝑖𝑡 is the gross housing endowment for household 𝑖 entering time 𝑡, defined previously, and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 is
the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income.
Berger et al. then use simulations of more complex models involving transactions costs, rental markets, more
realistic mortgage contracts and richer house price expectations. They show that, even though the formula no
longer holds exactly in these more complex models, it generally approximates the true elasticity well.
How does Berger et al.’s formula compare to mine? In fact, it bares striking similarities. Remember, in the
Cobb-Douglas case, I am approximating the elasticity 𝜔𝐻𝑖𝑡 as
𝜔𝐻𝑖𝑡 ≈ 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 =
𝑝𝐻𝑡−1?̃?𝑖𝑡
Λ𝑖𝑡
26If 𝜋 is distributed as a Bernoulli variable taking values 0 with frequency 1−𝑝 and 1 with frequency 𝑝, then ?̄?2𝑡 +Var(𝜋𝑡) = 𝑝 = ?̄?𝑡.
Whenever 𝜋 is distributed more uniformly between 0 and 1, then ?̄?2𝑡 +Var(𝜋𝑡) < ?̄?𝑡.
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where Λ𝑖𝑡 is discounted expected life-time wealth at the start of time 𝑡. Both approximations indicate that
the elasticity is proportional to gross housing wealth, and not net. The formulae differ in that whereas my
baseline formula has discounted lifetime wealth in the denominator, Berger et al. have 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 . In general, of
course, these expressions are different; they line up precisely, however, in the permanent income model with
perfect certainty. Their similarity is explained by Berger et al.’s further analysis. Berger et al. decompose
the effect of shocks into four components: the income effect, substitution effect, endowment effect, as well as a
collateral effect. They show numerically that the income, substitution and collateral effects cancel out, leaving
the endowment effect to drive the final elasticity. My formula is also driven ultimately by the endowment effect.
The main attraction of my formula is that it is easier to take to the data. The formula used by Berger et al.
requires computing 𝑀𝑃𝐶s at the household level. This computation is not realistically possible, not least
because of measurement error in consumption and income.27 Berger et al. therefore compute average 𝑀𝑃𝐶s
across the population, splitting by wealth level. On the other hand, with data on wealth and incomes it is
possible to compute discounted expected lifetime wealth and wealth shares, even if this computation requires
some further modelling choices. One main challenge in computing a household’s expected lifetime wealth is
pinning down the permanent component of income. Intuitively, this challenge is more easily met using income
panel data. In contrast, if only cross-sectional data is available, this computation has to be performed using
observed current income, which may be a poor proxy. In appendix F.3 I explore in further detail the data
requirements for accurately implementing the formulae derived here. I find that implementation is accurate as
long as one has access to a short panel of the type available in the present analysis. Briefly, with a short panel,
a one-year lead of current income can be used as a sort of instrument for permanent income when computing
key statistics such as Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1). For these reasons, I pursue the Euler equation approach in the empirical
application. I describe in detail how I estimate discounted expected lifetime wealth and the wealth shares in
practice in section 3.5.
Despite the similarities to Berger et al.’s formula, the main problem with my approach, however, is that it does
not capture collateral effects. However, I assess the importance of collateral effects when I explore the non-linear
solution to the full benchmark model in section 5. I use the analysis there to assess further the tradeoff between
Berger et al.’s approach and mine.
3 Data and Estimation Method
3.1 Overview and Nature of the Empirical Exercise
In my main empirical exercise I use the approximated model solution discussed in section 2. I take it to data
by computing the empirical counterparts of the theoretical moments expressed in equations 14, 15 and 16.
This implementation requires measures of the cross-sectional variances of income and consumption and their
covariance. It also requires measures of wealth shares: their means and their covariance with income and with
27More fundamentally, there is also the identification problem of splitting permanent shocks from transitory. Note that self-
reported MPCs are collected by Japelli and Pistaferri (2014), but I do not investigate these data here.
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consumption. Finally it requires estimates of the ex-post house price shock in each year. I use the model and
these inputs to estimate the raw drivers of inequality, and, in particular, the role of the housing market.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the only estimands in equations 14, 15 and 16 are the unobserved variances
of the income components. According to the model used, on the other hand, the contribution from the housing
market is directly observable. In brief, therefore, the point of the empirical exercise is to examine whether
accounting for housing market factors improves model fit. This exercise takes two specific forms: first I examine
to what extent accounting for the housing market explains movements in consumption inequality. Second I
examine to what extent accounting for the housing market changes estimates of income risk.
I use two primary data sources for the household: the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS).28 The FES provides cross-sectional data on household income and consumption
over 1989-2008. The BHPS provides yearly panel data on income and food consumption over 1991-2008, data
on housing wealth and mortgages over 1993-1995 and 1997-2008, and data on other financial wealth for 1995,
2000 and 2005. Both these datasets have been used extensively, and are described in detail in, for example,
Blundell and Etheridge (2010). Here I include some description of the datasets themselves as well as detailed
descriptions of my treatment. Finally, I use national house price data over 1969-2008 from the UK Office for
the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
The main empirical exercise is cross-sectional in nature, and relies on computing cross-sectional variances and
co-variances. I focus on cross-sectional properties of the data mainly because the quality of the consumption
data in the BHPS, as in most household panel surveys across the world, makes a detailed dynamic analysis
difficult. Nevertheless, and as extra supporting evidence, I show dynamic regressions of consumption and of
equity withdrawal in appendix F.4, table A4. These regressions indicate a strong response to house price shocks.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the analysis is partial equilibrium in nature, and so takes shocks to prices as
exogenous. As discussed elsewhere, the recent literature has explored house price effects in general equilibrium
and has explored a variety of underlying drivers, such as credit conditions or beliefs. In this light, and to extend
the main analysis presented here, in appendix C I consider equilibrium effects on inequality quantitatively in
a simple setting. Specifically, I consider the effect of aggregate income shocks, using stylized assumptions on
housing supply.
3.2 FES Cross-Sectional Data
The FES is an annual survey conducted chiefly for determining the basket of goods used to construct the retail
price index. The FES has been running since 1957, although it has only collected data in its present form on a
consistent basis since the 1970s. In a typical year the FES contains information on around 6500 households. In
general the households form a representative sample, but excluded are those not living in private houses, such
as residents of residential homes or students. For households participating in the FES, each member over 16
28The FES has since been renamed the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and then the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS).
In this paper I use its historic name.
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is asked to complete a diary detailing all their spending, both home and abroad, over a two week period. In
addition to this diary, household members perform an interview in which they are asked questions about their
demographic background, and asked to recall expenditures on large infrequently-purchased items (such as cars).
The main sample period is 1989-2008. I focus on the pre-crisis period for reasons I discuss later. The baseline
sample contains 133, 804 households. Each household is one data point. To each household I allocate a head,
for example the male in a household consisting of a married couple with children. The head then determines the
household’s assigned characteristics. My measure of education is the head’s age on leaving school or university.
The low education group comprises those leaving school at the compulsory schooling age (15 for those born
before 1957 and 16 thereafter). I use as population all households with heads aged 25-60. The sample is
formed as follows: I drop households for which the head is outside the age range, or where food consumption
or disposable income is negative, leaving 85, 119 households. For robustness of the results I trim the top and
bottom 1% of observations of each distribution. This leaves 84, 569 household consumption observations.
The income measure is total disposable income: labour earnings net of taxes, plus benefits and private transfers,
plus asset returns excluding the drawing down of capital or capital gains. Income therefore includes interest
and dividends from wealth but excludes imputed rent from a housing asset. The consumption measure is
expenditure on all items aside from housing and durables. It therefore consists mainly of spending on services
and semi-durables. In more detail, it includes spending on food, catering, alcohol, tobacco, ‘housing services’
(such as water bills), energy, household goods, household services, clothing, personal goods, motoring expenses,
travel expenses, leisure goods and leisure services. I deflate both income and consumption using the RPI index.
I compute residual measures of income and consumption after regressions on demographics, education, region
and a quartic polynomial in age.
To motivate the analysis I show patterns of mean income and consumption for various age groups. Here I
analyse rotating groups of those aged 30− 40, those aged 40− 50 and those aged 50− 60. Figure 1 shows mean
income and consumption for the younger two groups relative to the means for the older group, and normalized to
0 in 1996, the bottom of the housing market. The figure also shows data to 2013 to show some of the post-crisis
period. Notice that income for each group relative to the older group shows cyclical behaviour. Most striking,
however, are the patterns for the youngest group after the trough in the housing market in the mid-1990s. Here,
consumption for the youngest group lags far behind relative growth in income, implying large extra saving.
This extra saving indicates that the older age groups benefitted strongly from the house price boom. Notice
that the implied saving for the middle age group is very similar to that for the oldest group, deviating only in
the post-crisis period.
3.3 BHPS Panel Data
The BHPS is a comprehensive longitudinal study for the UK for general use in the social sciences, covering
1991-2008. The survey typically records around 5000 household interviews per year. The BHPS has detailed
information on earnings, hours worked and other income, and information on housing and durables.
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Notes: Figure shows relative mean income and consumption of each age group in each year relative to 50-60 year olds. Profiles
are re-based to 1996=0. Profiles are smoothed using a 3-year moving average..
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Despite being the main UK household panel survey, the BHPS has limited information on consumption. The
survey only contains questions about food consumed within the home (food ‘in’) and about small durables
purchases such as TVs and kitchen appliances, as well as about energy use. Within this group, only for food
does consumption plausibly equal expenditure. I therefore focus on these responses. Food consumption is
measured precisely in 1991 but then banded into twelve intervals for all years thereafter. The top interval is
unbounded above and the bottom is bounded by 0; the log of food consumption is therefore unbounded both
above and below. For all intermediate intervals I impute as my observation the interval midpoint. For the top
interval (over £160 per week) I impute £180 spending, for the bottom (less than £10 per week) I impute £5
spending. This procedure is similar to that reported in Etheridge (2015), who also provides a detailed validation
exercise. He shows that this simple assignment gives reliable results.
As for wealth, the BHPS has comprehensive information on housing values for most years: Homeowners are
asked to provide a self-assessed valuation of their property. Information on the main residence is available for
all years, and for other properties for all years except for 1991, 1992 and 1996. The extant value of mortgages
is given in all years except for 1991 and 1992. However, comprehensive information on financial wealth is
available for 1995, 2000 and 2005 only. These data include information on bank savings accounts, tax-free
savings accounts (such as Individual Savings Accounts), financial investments, unsecured debts and private
loans. The data for 1995 do not account for student loans and credit card debts, but I ignore this consideration
and treat the data as comparable across waves. While the value of the first house and the value of all mortgages
are reported exactly, the value of second homes and many items of financial wealth are reported in bands only.
For these banded data I follow, for example, Banks, Smith, and Wakefield (2002) in using imputations on the
value of each type of asset. The data on financial wealth come from the derived datasets reported in Banks
et al. (2002) and Crossley and O’Dea (2010).
The measure of income is identical to that in the FES. The income data come from Levy and Jenkins (2008),
who calculate total net household income based on the full reports of detailed income sources, together with
yearly details of the UK tax system. I use a current, rather than annual income measure: usual monthly income
at the time of interview. More precisely, net disposable income is defined as the sum of earned income, asset
income and transfers (public and private) minus state taxes (income tax and national insurance contributions).
Capital gains, or the drawing down of capital, are excluded. Pension income, which often comes from drawing
down capital, is included in the definition, but because I focus on heads of working age, its contribution is small.
I form residual measures of food consumption and income just as for the FES data.
The sample selection proceeds as follows: I use only the core BHPS sample and ignore the low-income booster
sample. I follow similar sample formation and selection procedures for the BHPS as followed for the FES. The
raw BHPS sample over 1993-2008 contains 69, 770. In the three years with financial wealth data, 1995, 2000
and 2005, it contains 13,105 households. I remove households for whom the head is outside the age range,
and those for whom educational status is missing.29 For the cohorts I focus on, those born in the 1950s and
1960s, this leaves a baseline sample comprising 26,543 observations over 1993-2008 and 4,985 observations in
29The measure of education in the BHPS is qualification level. I define low education as those with no qualification higher than
an O-level, the national exam at age 16 in the UK. I remove those whose educational status is missing because education is an
important regressor when forming residual food and income measures.
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the years with financial wealth data. I then trim the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of disposable
income and remove observations. By taking logs I also remove any negative income observations, comprising
0.6% of the initial sample themselves. I do not trim the food consumption distribution: because expenditures
are assigned to 12 bands there is not the same chance of reporting implausibly high or low observations through
mis-coding, or omission of a component. Unlike the FES, where each questionnaire is completed in entirety, the
BHPS questionnaires are often incomplete, so the quoted statistics are computed using fewer observations. For
example, the number of income observations remaining in the three years with financial wealth data is 4,258 and
the number of food observations is 4,465. Over 1993-2008 the equivalent sample sizes are 22,420 and 24,214.
3.4 ODPM House Price Data
The national house price data come from the UK Office for the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). The ODPM
published a quarterly house price index over 1968-2011 based on data from the UK Survey of Mortgage
Lenders.30 For most of its history, the survey has involved a variety of mortgage lenders supplying a 5%
sample of their completions from the preceding month. The main disadvantage of the ODPM data is that it
excludes cash purchases, around 25% of all deals. Ultimately, however, the time series provided is very similar
to that from other sources, such as the Land Registry. I use the annual time-series over 1969-2008 and deflate
by the UK retail price index.
3.5 Estimating the Wealth Share Measures
The empirical application requires measures of the shares of the different components of household wealth in
total expected life-time wealth. The important components, which appear in equations 15 and 16, are housing
wealth and discounted labour (human capital) wealth. The other components in total life-time wealth are:
mortgage debt (as a liability) and other financial wealth, such as holdings in savings accounts. The housing
wealth share 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, for example, is therefore operationalized as:
Gross housing wealth𝑡−1
Gross housing wealth𝑡−1 + Expected discounted labour income𝑡 +Other current wealth𝑡−1
To compute this measure I perform similar steps to that reported in Etheridge (2015). I sum jointly-held assets
with those held individually by the head, spouse and other household members. By including all household
members I am assuming complete resource pooling within the household. This assumption is consistent with
using income and food consumption at the household level. I compute discounted human capital wealth by the
following procedure. First, I estimate permanent income by averaging income at time 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑡 + 2, to
smooth measurement error and transitory shocks. I take the twice-forward income rather than 𝑡 − 1 income,
because later I calculate the covariance with time 𝑡− 1 variables, and so remove spurious correlation from, say,
measurement error. I discuss the effect of using the lead of current income in these calculations in more detail
30This house price index was taken on by the Department of Communities and Local Government before being discontinued in
2011. As with the FES, I use the historic title.
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in appendix F.3. I then assume a ‘net’ discount rate on future income of 4%pa. This discount rate consists of
growth in income net of pure discounting. This discount rate can be rationalized, for example, as consisting of
income growth of −1%pa and a market interest rate of 3%pa, which is consistent with the data and calibration
for middle-aged households used in section 5. Asset and debt positions are taken using time 𝑡 − 1 values as
discussed in section 2. I then remove outliers of the wealth share measures by trimming the top and bottom
1% of their distributions. Finally, because complete wealth data are only available for 1995, 2000 and 2005, I
interpolate wealth share moments in other years. Briefly, I do this as follows: recall that the BHPS contains
data on housing wealth in all years and complete data on housing wealth (including second homes and mortgage
debt) for all years except for 1991, 1992 and 1996. I therefore compute approximate wealth share moments
after 1992 (and excluding 1996) using these incomplete data and compute a final profile for the wealth share
moments using a combination of the precise and approximate measures. This procedure allows for estimates
of the housing wealth share (involving 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1) for 1994-2007.
31 Details are provided in appendix F.1. When
estimating the income process I also require wealth share measures before 1994. My procedure for computing
these is discussed below. I perform robustness checks against all these assumptions. Most importantly, and as
discussed below, varying the discount rate for future income changes the results little.
The main omission from my measure of life-time resources is wealth from pensions. I ignore pensions because
they are very illiquid and households likely discount this far-distant wealth strongly (Carroll, 1997). As a
practical matter, pensions wealth data are available for those who appear in the 2000 wave over 1991-2001,
but not up to 2005. The data for 1991-2001 come from Emmerson, Disney, Wakefield, and Tetlow (2008), who
impute values based on pension scheme participation, earnings histories observed within the BHPS time frame,
and imputed earnings in previous periods from retrospective questions on employment histories. I discuss how
including pension wealth affects results for 2000 in section 4.
Finally, my empirical application requires measures of the covariances of the wealth shares with total non-
housing consumption. Because the BHPS only contains data on consumption of food, I infer broad non-housing
consumption from this narrower variable. To do this I use results from Etheridge (2015), who in turn follows
Blundell et al. (2008) by estimating a food demand equation using the FES data. In this paper I use the
central estimate of the income elasticity and scale up covariances and variances accordingly. For example, the
covariance Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1) in equation 16 is computed as
1
𝜒𝑓
Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑓𝑡−1) where 𝑓𝑡−1 is log residual food
consumption in time 𝑡− 1, and the income elasticity is 𝜒𝑓 . In this paper, I use a value of 0.38 for 𝜒𝑓 in keeping
with established estimates more widely.
3.6 Estimating the House Price Process
As discussed in section 2, I assume real house prices follow a random walk with drift. Using this model, I
estimate an average real return on housing of 0.034 with a standard deviation of shocks of 0.089. These are
estimated over 1969-2008 from the ODPM data. In the empirical application, I take the residuals from this
estimation as the shocks that households face.
31I obtain wealth share measures in 2007 by omitting this time 𝑡+ 2 income and using just time 𝑡+ 1 values. I do not compute
wealth share measures for 2008.
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To validate this approach, I conduct a simple investigation of the house price time series. I run the following
regression:





where ln 𝑝𝐻𝑡 is the log real house price and 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 is the innovation. I estimate ?̂?𝐻 = −0.135 with a t-value of -1.55
(39 observations). This raw estimate implies some autoregression in prices. However, a Dickey-Fuller test fails
to reject the presence of a unit root at any reasonable level of significance.
As also discussed in section 2, I focus on national house price changes and ignore more local price changes. To
explore house prices in more detail, figure 2 shows a price index for both the UK as a whole and across selected
sub-regions. I show the series back to the early 1970s, to the left of the first vertical line, to show the boom of
the early 2000s in historic context. I also extend the data to 2016 to show the the post-crisis period. The data
in this figure come from a mortgage lender, Nationwide, because the ODPM data series do not extend back by
region so far. For this figure, I have selected 5 of the 11 sub-regions which are the most atypical. The other
sub-regions of the British Isles more closely follow the UK average.32 For the UK as a whole, the figure shows
that the rise in house prices leading up to the financial crisis was unprecedented in length and scale. From the
trough in 1995 to the peak in early 2008, this rise was over 50 percentage points larger than the previous boom
in the late 1980s. Additionally, the preceding decline, from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s was far larger than
any previous decline.
At the regional level, the implications of figure 2 are nuanced. For example, since the onset of the financial crisis,
regional house price dispersion has increased substantially: Since 2008, prices in London have grown faster than
in the North, the cheapest region, by over 5%pa. Even before the financial crisis, regions have differed in the
precise timing of booms and busts. Consequently, many studies (such as Attanasio et al., 2009 and Campbell
and Cocco, 2007) have used regional and local house price variation for identification. However, it is clear that
the long boom in house prices, and the previous decline, were nation-wide phenomena. For example, in contrast
to the later large rise in regional house price dispersion, prices in London grew faster than those in the North
only by around 1%pa over 1973-2008.
In terms of my empirical application, note I regress consumption on regional dummies. Therefore, to the extent
that regional variation contributes to consumption dispersion, I control for effects between regions and measure
the average effects on inequality within regions. However, one would be concerned that a large increase in
regional price variation reflects a stretching of the house price distribution over and above pure regional effects.
For this reason, I concentrate on the period before the financial crisis, during with the common price change is
most pronounced.
As a final point, house price shocks can also, of course, be local or even idiosyncratic at the house-specific level.
Remember, by not considering these shocks, my analysis of how house prices drive consumption inequality
32The only UK region for which house prices follow a noticeably different path is Northern Ireland (not shown). However, Northern
Ireland is a tiny component of the UK and is not included in the FES data which are used in this paper. Accordingly, and strictly
speaking, my analysis concerns Great Britain. However, I refer to United Kingdom (which includes Northern Ireland), because this
is the more recognized country title.
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Figure 2: House Prices Across the UK.
Source: Nationwide.
Notes: Selected regions shown only. Omitted regions are: Yorkshire, North West, East Midlands, West Midlands, South East and
Northern Ireland. Profiles are log real prices re-based to UK average = 0 in 1973. Profiles are smoothed using a 3-period moving
average.
growth is conservative. However, even if I could incorporate idiosyncratic shocks, the analysis here becomes more
involved. Idiosyncratic house price changes are often caused by investments in the house such as developments
and refurbishment or, in the other direction, by excessive depreciation caused by dereliction. These idiosyncratic
changes would not be new information to the household, and need not represent a net change in the household’s
lifetime wealth.
3.7 Estimating the Income Process Taking into Account House Price Shocks
One motivation for this study is to see how allowing for asset price shocks affects estimates of income risks. I
therefore estimate the income process specified by equations 5 and 6, using the moment conditions given by
formulae 14-16. As discussed, these cross-sectional moments have been used to estimate this dynamic income
model since Blundell and Preston (1998). Blundell et al. (2013) provide a recent analysis. The estimation
requires using fixed groups of households across years. I therefore estimate the process for two decade-of-birth
cohorts; those born in the 1950s, and the 1960s. I require that all heads be between 25 and 60 in any period.
Therefore the sample period for those born in the 1960s begins in 1994. For the estimation procedure, I use a
two-step generalized minimum distance procedure. This estimation procedure is slightly more involved than the
classical minimum distance procedure used in, say, Blundell and Preston (1998) because the empirical moments
are not additively separable from the estimable parameters. The procedure is discussed in detail in appendix
E, which also discusses computation of (asymptotic) standard errors. I give an overview here.
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In the first step I compute the 3𝑇 moment conditions which comprise the left hand sides of formulae 14-16.
These are the changes to the variances of log residual income and log consumption, and their covariance for each
period. I then compute observable components of the right hand side. The first set of components comprises
the wealth shares and covariances with the income and consumption distributions from the BHPS. These are
available over 1994−2007 using the procedure described above. I obtain measures for 1989−1994 for the 1950s
cohort by using the growth rates at the equivalent ages for the 1960s cohort, observed over 1999− 2004. This
imputation is likely conservative because the housing wealth share grew strongly over 1999 − 2004, whereas
it likely declined over 1989 − 1994. I am therefore likely understating the wealth share in the early 1990s.
Second, I use the estimates of the house price shocks, 𝜁𝐻𝑡 , from the ODPM. Finally, I impose that 𝛼𝑡, the
annuity value of transitory shocks, is zero. Estimation allowing for a small positive value of 𝛼 is discussed
by Blundell et al. (2013). In the second step I estimate components of the income process by the minimum
distance procedure. The components are Var(𝜈𝑡), the variance of permanent shocks, and ΔVar(𝑢𝑡), the growth
in variance of transitory shocks. I therefore ultimately estimate 2 parameters in each of 𝑇 years. Using the 3𝑇
moment conditions results in 𝑇 degrees of freedom. To emphasize, I extend the standard framework used in
the literature by incorporating the extra information on housing wealth and prices. When estimating I use the
identity weighting matrix to eliminate well-known bias from using the optimal weighting matrix (see Altonji
and Segal, 1996). Appendix E also gives details of a multi-step estimator when using the (estimated) optimal
weighting matrix.
4 Main Results
Before discussing the main results, I present the inequality measures for the two cohorts I study. The income
and consumption measures are shown together with their covariance in Figure 3. This figure shows both the raw
measures, year by year, alongside smoothed time series computed using a 3-period moving average. Notice that,
overall, and on all measures, inequality grew faster for the 1950s cohort than for the 1960s cohort. To reconcile
the inequality movements completely requires estimating income processes for each cohort. First, though, I
focus on one core feature which is common across cohorts: consumption inequality grew more slowly than the
other moments until the mid-1990s, then more quickly thereafter.
I illustrate the main point of the paper in figure 4. It shows the log real house price, alongside the difference
between the consumption measure of inequality and the covariance measure for both cohorts. For the rest of
the paper, I call changes to this difference the ‘excess’ growth in consumption inequality. Again the figure
shows the raw points for the inequality measures alongside a smoothed time-series, now computed using a 4th-
order polynomial. Recall from the discussion in section 2 that both the consumption and covariance inequality
measures capture dispersion in permanent income. According to that discussion, if changes to permanent
differences across households are driven by shocks to flow income, such as from labour earnings, then these
inequality measures should grow at a similar rate.33 Figure 4, however, shows two points clearly. First,
33It is reasonable that the level of consumption inequality is higher than the covariance, because of measurement error in ex-
penditures. I focus on growth in the inequality measures, not levels, implicitly assuming that the magnitude of measurement error
remains constant over time.
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Figure 3: Inequality Profiles by Cohort.
Notes: Solid lines show profiles smoothed using a 3-period moving average.
consumption inequality grew much faster than the covariance measure from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s
for both cohorts. This excess growth for the 1960s cohort from trough to peak is around 6 log points (growth in
the log measure by 0.06), according to the smoothed time series. This is a large increase, compared to say, the
growth in the 1980s inequality boom.34 Second, this excess growth in inequality is clearly strongly correlated
with the housing market. The troughs and the peaks coincide almost perfectly with the house price index for
both cohorts.
As discussed in section 2, the relationship between consumption inequality and asset prices depends on how
assets are distributed across households. To explore this relationship, I show some features of the distribution of
the housing wealth share in figure 5. It shows distributions for 1995 and 2005 wealth values for the two cohorts,
using kernel density plots. It is worth emphasizing that this figure uses the gross housing wealth share: that is,
it doesn’t subtract mortgages, but includes the value of all first and second homes. This gross housing wealth
share is the relevant measure in the calculations. The density estimates are always bi-modal, with peaks for
non-home-owners and then for households with positive housing wealth. The figure further shows that, in both
years, the 1950s cohort on average had a higher housing wealth share than the 1960s cohort. It also shows the
effect of the housing boom: the 1960s cohort had a much higher share of housing wealth in 2005 than the 1950s
cohort did in 1995, when they were the same age. Finally, the figure shows that the housing wealth share is
particularly dispersed in the later years and particularly for the younger cohorts. A high housing wealth share
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Figure 4: House Prices and Excess Growth in Consumption Inequality.
Notes: Left-hand axes show the difference between var log consumption and the covariance of consumption and income in log
points. This is the ‘excess’ growth in consumption inequality. Axes are the same across both graphs. Right-hand axes show
detrended real house price index. Difference in inequality measures smoothed using a quartic polynomial.
typically indicates that the household is highly leveraged.
Most importantly, how do these housing wealth shares covary with the consumption and income distributions?
Before discussing the estimates that are used in the estimation I first show roughly how food consumption and
income correlate with different measures of engagement with the housing market. These correlations are shown
in figure 6, for the 1950s cohort, and figure 7, for the 1960s cohort. The top left plot shows correlations of
residual income and residual food expenditure with a binary indicator of homeownership. The top right shows
correlations with house value and is therefore restricted to homeowners. The bottom left shows correlations
with the key statistic used in the analysis, the gross housing wealth share. The bottom right panel introduces a
leverage variable. This leverage variable is defined as zero for renters and defined for homeowners as the ratio of
net financial debt (mortgages and loans minus financial assets) to gross housing wealth, truncated at zero. The
overall impression we obtain from these panels is that all measures of engagement are positively correlated with
food expenditure and with income. In particular, in the bottom panels, the left-hand graph points to a housing
wealth effect, while the bottom right-hand panel points to effects coming from the collateral channel. Both these
graphs therefore indicate that a positive house price should cause inequality to grow, while a negative shock
should cause inequality to decline. I analyse the housing wealth channel in the present section. The collateral
channel is left until section 5.
Figures 6 and 7 show the rough correlations of key housing measures with consumption and with income.
However, they cannot be related directly to the model. For this we need not correlations, but covariances.
Detailed estimates of these wealth share moments are given in table 1. Here I show the wealth measures
using the complete wealth information in 1995, 2000 and 2005. As discussed in section 3, I use partial wealth
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Figure 5: Kernel Density Estimates of the Gross Housing Share by Cohort and by Year.
Notes: Housing wealth share computed as described in text. Kernel densities generated using an epanechnikov kernel with the
following bandwidths: 0.015 for 1950s cohort and 0.0125 for 1960s cohort in 1995; 0.03 for 1950s cohort and 0.02 for 1960s cohort
in 2005.
information to impute moments in other years. For the years shown, the most important moments are given
in the first two columns. They relate to the inputs used in formulae 14-16 in section 2. In particular, the first
column gives Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡), the covariance of the housing wealth share with log household consumption, net of
predictable components. Recall that we do not observe total household consumption but rather expenditure on
food. This measure therefore uses the covariance with food, scaled up by the inverse of the income elasticity
of demand, taken to be 0.38 (see Etheridge, 2015 for a detailed discussion and estimation). Notice that the
covariance is positive and statistically significant in most years. This feature implies that positive house price
shocks should indeed cause the consumption variance to increase. To provide context to the covariances, and to
link to the information shown in figures 6 and 7, I show raw correlations of the housing wealth share measure
with food expenditure in square brackets.
Similarly, the second column shows the covariance of the housing wealth share with log household income, net
of predictable components. This moment relates to the theoretical predictions from expression 15. However, in
this case, comparing theory with data is complicated by the fact that the relevant input is not the covariance
with current income, but rather with log permanent income, 𝑦𝑃𝑡 , which is not observed. Current income might
not give a good proxy in this case, because, in theory, it should be more positively correlated with wealth than
is permanent income. This is because households save, rather than consume, the bulk of transitory fluctuations.




𝑡 ) for this reason, then estimating permanent income by averaging 𝑦𝑡
and 𝑦𝑡−1 or by instrumenting 𝑦𝑡 with 𝑦𝑡−1 will not help, because transitory income in period 𝑡− 1 is also mostly
saved, and so induces a similar bias.35 Therefore I conclude that the estimates in the second column are upper
bounds on the relevant input. Most importantly, they are quantitatively smaller than the covariance with
consumption. Therefore, for the baseline results I ignore Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡 , 𝑦
𝑃
𝑡 ) and treat it as zero, but I also discuss
calculations incorporating the covariance with current income.




Table 1: Wealth Share Estimates by Cohort
year Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡) Cov(𝜓
𝐻












1995 0.0065 0.0079 0.1501 -0.0485 0.0098 0.0069 0.1473 ...
(0.0061) (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0149)
[0.065] [0.164]
2000 0.0156 0.0079 0.1698 -0.0404 0.0168 0.0059 0.1626 0.0093
(0.0067) (0.0034) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0150) (0.0055)
[0.114] [0.131]
2005 0.0271 0.0092 0.3071 -0.0298 0.0340 0.0117 0.1526 ...
(0.0103) (0.0046) (0.0092) (0.0052) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0155)
[0.143] [0.106]
1960s Cohort
1995 0.0116 0.0050 0.1063 -0.0627 0.0085 0.0045 0.1291 ...
(0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0096)
[0.132] [0.108]
2000 0.0106 0.0061 0.1282 -0.0649 0.0096 0.0041 0.1446 0.0098
(0.0041) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0026) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0111) (0.0033)
[0.109] [0.129]
2005 0.0141 0.0023 0.2431 -0.0744 0.0214 0.0071 0.1335 ...
(0.0074) (0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0110)
[0.100] [0.034]
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses and obtained using a bootstrap with 1000 draws. Numbers is square
brackets are correlation coefficients. The values shown in the first column are the correlation coefficient of the wealth
share with food expenditure. 𝜓𝐻 is the share of housing in lifetime wealth, 𝜓𝑂 the share of other financial wealth
(including mortgages). 𝑦𝑡 is log residual current income, 𝑓𝑡 is log residual food. 𝜓
*𝐻 is the share of housing in
lifetime wealth, including pension wealth. Cov(𝑥𝑡, 𝑐𝑡) is computed as Cov(𝑥𝑡, 𝑓𝑡)/𝜒𝑓 where 𝜒𝑓 is the elasticity of food
consumption with respect to total consumption, taken to be 0.38. See text for more details.
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Notes: Profiles smoothed using a 3-period moving average. Leverage is defined as zero for renters and for homeowners with
positive current financial wealth, i.e. for whom savings are greater than mortgage debt. Otherwise it is calculated as minus the
ratio of current financial wealth (principally savings minus mortgage debt) to gross housing wealth.
It is worth discussing briefly the other empirical moments in table 1, presented in the columns further to the
right. The third column corroborates the message from figure 5. It shows that the share of life-time wealth
allocated to housing is greater for the 1950s cohort in each time period, but is higher for the 1960s cohort
when comparing age by age. The fourth column shows strikingly that other wealth is negative in all years.
This feature arises because average mortgage debt exceeds other financial wealth in all these cells. I omit from
table 1 the mean share of human capital wealth, ?̄?𝑡; this share can be inferred simply by subtracting the shares
of housing wealth and other financial wealth from 1. Moving on, the fifth and sixth columns show that the
variance of the housing wealth share is typically higher than the variance of the other wealth share: the variance
of the housing wealth share has grown substantially over time, reflecting the effect of the house price boom on
stretching this aspect of inequality. The seventh column shows dispersion in residual log food.
Finally, for robustness, the eighth column shows an alternative estimate of the covariance of the housing wealth
share with consumption, the most important moment driving inequality. This alternative estimate is obtained
by including pension wealth in total life-time wealth. The pension wealth data come from calculations performed
by Emmerson et al. (2008) and discussed in section 3. I only show the covariance for 2000 because the data
are not available for 2005 and, for 1995, they are only available for those who also appear in the 2000 wave,
which gives a selected sample. This final column shows that including pension wealth does bring the covariance
down somewhat, particularly for the older cohort, implying a lesser effect of house price shocks on consumption
inequality. However, pension wealth, in the estimates shown, is likely overweighted. This is because the pension
incomes used to compute this wealth measure have been discounted quite lightly at 2%pa. Pension wealth is,
however, likely discounted highly by consumers during working life (Carroll, 1997), and is, of course, highly
illiquid. Presumably, the estimate of the covariance of the wealth share with consumption when using a higher
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Notes: Profiles smoothed using a 3-period moving average. For notes on variable definitions see figure 6.
discount rate would lie somewhere between the two estimates shown.
I can plug in the main estimates from table 1 to compute simply the effect of the house price boom on excess
growth in inequality, according to expressions 14 to 16. The results are given in table 2. Before discussing these,
note that I define the house price boom as between 1997 and 2004, because it is only between these years that
house prices increased above trend. Over 1989 to 1995, in contrast, house prices decreased in real terms, while
in 1996 and 2005-06, house prices increases were positive but below trend. Over the boom years of ’97 to ’04,
however, the log of average house prices increased above trend by 0.46 (58%).
Table 2: Contribution of House Price Shocks to ‘Excess’ Growth in Consumption Inequality
Cohort Accumulated Average Total contribution % contribution of
shock growth to contribution of to (log) consumption observed total








1950s 0.46 (58%) 0.019 0.019 47.1
1960s 0.46 (58%) 0.017 0.017 29.9
Notes: The observed excess growth in consumption inequality over 1997-2004 was 4.1 log points
for the 1950s cohort and 5.8 log points for the 1960s cohort. ‘Excess’ growth in consumption
inequality is defined as growth in the variance of log consumption over and above the covariance of
log consumption with log income.
The first column of table 2 shows the size of the house price boom. The remaining columns of table 2 give
further details on the calculation of excess inequality growth. Recall from expression 16 that the variance of
log consumption is boosted by 2𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝜓
𝐻
𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1) where 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 is the house price shock. For example, in 2000,
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the shock to prices above trend was 0.071 log points (7.4%) and the wealth covariance for the 1950s cohort
was 0.019. Therefore the contribution to the inequality measure was 2 × 0.071 × 0.016 = 0.0023, or 0.23
log points. Accordingly the second column of table 2 shows the average value of Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1) over ’97-’04.
The sum total of all the yearly contributions is given in the third column. For the 1950s cohort the effect of
house price increases is calculated to be around 1.9 log points, just under 50% of the observed excess growth in
consumption inequality. For the 1960s cohort, the contribution was slightly smaller, and given that the excess
growth in inequality was higher, it forms an even smaller proportion of the total.
The remainder of the excess inequality growth can be explained in a number of ways. First, remember that the
estimated trend increase in house prices, at 3.4%pa, is quite high. At this level, positive shocks to house prices
are perhaps understated. If households have lower expectations for house price increases then the true shocks
would be higher, as would be the implied contribution to excess inequality growth. For example, if expected
growth in house prices were only 1%pa, then the estimated positive shock over the boom years would be raised
by 17 log points. Accordingly the contribution to excess inequality would increase by 17 percentage points
for the 1950s cohort and by 11 percentage points for the 1960s cohort. Second, I have assumed a house price
process that is common across the distribution. If, as discussed by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), house prices
become more dispersed during booms and more compressed during slumps, then this heterogeneity would also
contribute to the observed pattern of consumption inequality. Recall I have deliberately used a sample period
in this analysis characterized by aggregate rather than heterogeneous shocks, because heterogeneous shocks are
harder to assess. Nevertheless heterogeneous price movements are undoubtedly important and likely explain
some portion of growth in the inequality that remains.
As a final point I discuss how I can refine these calculations, and check robustness against alternative modelling
assumptions. Recall from formulae 14-16 in section 2 that other moments of the wealth data are relevant for
explaining the profile of inequality: specifically the variance of the housing wealth share, and the covariance
with income. The contribution from the variance of the housing share, given by its product with the square of
the housing shock, is negligible. For example in 2000 it was 0.0712 × 0.016 < 0.0001. The covariance of the
housing share with permanent income is potentially more important. When we take it into account by proxying
permanent income with current income, then the estimated total contribution of housing shocks goes down to
1.6 log points for the 1950s cohort and 1.5 log points for the 1960s cohort. But as discussed above, if, as is
likely, current income is an imperfect proxy for permanent income, then these results provide a lower bound
on the contribution. In terms of robustness, the most important assumption used is the choice of discount
rate used on future income. When the discount rate is lower, for example, housing wealth is less important
in total life-time wealth and so the effect of shocks is reduced. Therefore to check how sensitive results are to
this choice, I re-compute the statistics using a low net discount rate of 1%pa and a high discount rate of 7%pa.
Results are robust to these more extreme choices: for the 1950s cohort a high discount rate raises the estimated
contribution by about 10 percentage points, while for the 1960s cohort a high discount rate raises the estimated
contribution by around 8 percentage points. The results with the lower discount rate are roughly symmetric. I
show the wealth share moments under these alternative discount rates in appendix F.2, table A3.
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5 Exploring Non-Linearities in the Model
In this section I solve the full model specified in section 1 and use it to explore the effect on inequality of
potentially important consumption non-linearities. After discussing how I parametrize and calibrate the model,
I use it for three specific purposes. First I compare the wealth share measure to the true elasticity from the full
benchmark model to compare the accuracy of the main approximation. I find the wealth share approximation
works well in a number of key dimensions. Second, given that my main approximation is imperfect, and
most importantly omits effects from collateral constraints, I then use the benchmark model to compute the
contribution to the true elasticity arising from collateral effects. I then use this simulation-based measure to
quantify the effect of this collateral channel on the empirical inequality profiles.
Third, and finally, I extend the benchmark model yet further to include additional model elements. Here, I
allow for time-varying rent-to-price ratios, arising from a constant rental price. I also explore preferences over
housing and consumption that differ from the Cobb-Douglas benchmark, using elasticities of substitution both
below and above one. In this third group of exercises I again compare the wealth share measure to the true
elasticity. The conclusion from these exercises is that, after exploring a rich variety of models built on the same
class, the main results are highly robust. I leave details of the numerical solution of all the models to appendix
D.
5.1 Calibration
A model period is a year. Households enter the model aged 25 and retire at 65. They die with certainty at age
82, matching average life expectancy for those aged 25 in the UK.
As in section 2, households’ intratemporal preferences are Cobb-Douglas, implying a unitary elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and housing. I set the mean elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to
0.5, implying a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2.
I compute the deterministic component of post-tax income from the BHPS. As with the other life-cycle profiles
described later, I proceed by first taking means for each year and age-group cell. I then compute a life-cycle
component by regressing these cells on a fourth-order polynomial in age, and time dummies.36 For the stochastic
component, household income has transitory and fully permanent components, characterized by a unit root.
The variance of permanent shocks is set to 0.005, corresponding to an annual standard deviation of shocks of
7%. This value roughly matches the growth in all inequality measures for both cohorts shown in figure 3. This
value further implies that each cohort experiences a growth in the variance of log earnings between ages 25
and 65 of 20 log points. The variance of the initial distribution of permanent differences is set to 0.2 and the
variance of transitory shocks is set to 0.05. To interpret these values, it is useful to consider, for example, the
initial variance of log income for the 1960’s cohort, observed in the FES, and shown in figure 3. According to the
parameters chosen, the bulk of the observed initial variance arises from differences in the permanent component.
36Mean life-time income is likely determined more by cohort rather than time effects. However, it is important to control for time
effects when estimating life-cycle housing wealth. For consistency, therefore, I use the same procedure when estimating all life-cycle
inputs.
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The remaining share can then be thought of as being comprised roughly equally of genuine transitory differences
and pure measurement error, which is left unmodelled.
I determine households’ pension income using a formula based on last-period post-tax income. Specifically, I
use a two-part linear formula to match two features of observed life-cycle income: the mean, and the change in
income dispersion for those aged 70−75 compared to those aged 55−60. Accordingly, households in the model
receive a pension composed of 90% of any final-period income below the median, and 50% of any final-period
income above the median. The full profile for income over the life-cycle is shown in appendix figure A1. All
relevant life-cycle variables (income, housing wealth, financial wealth) are equivalized using the modified OECD
scale and normalized by setting the median income for incoming households at age 25 to 1.
House prices grow at mean rate 1% per annum, with a standard deviation of innovations of 9% pa. The variance
of house price shocks matches the yearly innovations to prices in the data. The house price growth I use in
the model is somewhat below the trend growth observed in the data since the late 1960s and used in section 4,
which is around 3.4% pa. From the viewpoint of the model, therefore, house prices in the UK have grown more
than expected. When simulating the model forward, however, house prices grow on trend, and therefore I do
not try to recreate dynamics of the wealth distribution determined by the boom. Depreciation is set at 2% per
annum, and is fully offset by maintenance. The yearly interest rate is set to 3%. I set the transaction cost to
5%, in line with established estimates.
I set the collateral requirement to be 10%. This value captures the median loan-to-value on mortgages to first-
time buyers in the UK until the financial crisis.37 The collateral constraint here has to be met in each period.
The model therefore does not fully account for the long-term nature of standard mortgage contracts. This
feature of mortgage contracts is included, for example, in the model of Kaplan et al. (2017). They emphasize its
role in their result that a collateral channel is less important than the wealth channel in explaining consumption
behaviour. My model therefore likely allows for a greater collateral effect than theirs. However, although
mortgage contracts in the UK are long-term, they show important short-term features. Specifically, as Best,
Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2018) discuss, almost all households in the UK refinance their mortgages 2 years
after origination, because mortgage contracts are sold with low initial rates which thereafter revert to a rate
which is much higher. To be able to refinance in this way, households need to meet similar lending conditions
as at origination.
I set the the initial (joint) distribution of homeownership, of house values, of (liquid) financial wealth and
income as follows: I pool data for those aged between 23 and 27 over all years. I simulate individuals at age
25 to match the means and variances of all these variables. The important associations are a strong positive
correlation between house value (for owners) and financial wealth, and a slightly weaker positive correlation
between house value and income. All other correlations, including those with homeownership, are weaker and
consequently set to zero.
37Data are available from the Council of Mortgage Lenders. See for example https://data.gov.uk/dataset/median-loan-to-value-
ratio-for-first-time-buyers for data from 2005. Even during the slump in the early 1990s median loan-to-value ratios were at least
90%.
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I calibrate the model by matching to three life-cycle profiles. These are: the homeownership rate; mean housing
wealth, and the fraction of homeowners who are highly levered. This ‘constrained’ fraction I compute in both
the model and the data as the fraction of households with a ratio of net financial debt to house value greater
than 60%. Results are robust to using different thresholds.38 As discussed above, I compute these life-cycle
profiles from the data by allowing for age and for time effects. I base the profiles on 2000 values, when complete
information on wealth is available, and after the market had picked up from the mid 1990s, but long before
the market had reached a peak. The choice of moments in the calibration is similar to that in Berger et al.
(2018) (henceforth in this section BGLV), except I focus on the constrained fraction rather than on mean liquid
financial wealth. I do this to match closely the likely importance of collateral effects across the population.
The parameters used in the calibrated model are shown in table 3. The value for housing services in the utility
function is higher than in calibrations using US data, because the ratio of housing wealth to income is higher.
To match life-cycle saving I calibrate the rate of time preference 𝛽 and the bequest motive Φ. The value of the
discount rate here is particularly important for matching the share of households that are highly constrained.
It therefore gives a good indication of the ultimate strength of the various channels from house prices through
to household consumption. In studies which find a strong affect of collateral constraints on consumption (and
house prices themselves), such as BGLV or Favilukis et al. (2017), then 𝛽 is typically low (strong discounting).
In contrast a wealth effect is typically more important when 𝛽 is higher such as in Kaplan et al. (2017). The
value of 𝛽 found here is between these studies, though closer to that in Kaplan et al..
Table 3: Calibrated Housing Model: Parameter Values





2 3% 1% 9% 2% 10% 5% 0.005 0.05
Chosen to hit lifecycle a 𝛽 Φ 𝜒25 𝜒65 𝜒𝑟𝑒𝑡
0.83 0.953 16.0 0.0405 0.0385 0.0395
Notes: 𝜎𝑝𝐻 is the standard deviation of house price innovations. 𝑟 ≡ 𝑅− 1 is the risk-free interest
rate. All other variables are defined in section 1, and discussed in the text.
Finally, I choose the rental cost to match life-cycle home ownership. The rental cost parameter here can be
thought of as a reduced form which captures various aspects of the true reasons to rent or own. Most importantly,
these include the moral hazard premium on renting, and a pure utility taste for renting versus owning. Here I
flexibly choose an age-varying rental cost to match homeownership over the lifecycle. I allow for a gradient on
the rental cost between ages 25 and 65 and a discrete change to a different rental cost after retirement.
The data and model moments used in the calibration are shown in figure 8 in the top two and the bottom
left panels. These panels show I match the targeted statistics well. In particular, apart from young ages, the
fraction of households who are constrained is low both in the model and in the data. I also show mean liquid
wealth as in BGLV in the bottom right panel for completeness, and as a measure of out-of-sample performance.
This panel shows I match mean liquid wealth well on average, although this mean is slightly too low at middle
ages, and slightly too high at retirement.
38A noticeable difference arises between the simulations and the data only in the number of households with a leverage greater
than 80%. For example, in the data there are a non-negligible fraction of households with leverage greater than 95%. This reflects
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Figure 8: Calibration and Out-of-Sample Performance





























Mean Liquid Wealth - Out of Sample
Simulation
Data
Notes: ‘Constrained’ is defined as having liquid financial debt (or ‘other current’ debt) greater than 60% of gross housing wealth.
5.2 Accuracy of the Wealth-Share Approximation
I now show the accuracy of the housing wealth share, 𝜓𝐻 , as an approximation of the true elasticity. I do
this by computing 𝜓𝐻 as the share of gross housing wealth in total discounted expected life-time wealth in the
model simulations, as in section 3. In particular, I discount future income at the market interest rate (3%pa).
The raw relationship between the two measures is shown in the left-hand plot of figure 9, which is similar to a
computation shown by Kaplan et al. (2017).39 To produce this graph I pool simulated households aged 30−65,
who are representative of those studied in this paper.4041 I then group the simulated households into renters
and, for homeowners, into ventiles of the distribution of 𝜓𝐻 , the housing wealth share. For each ventile I then
plot the average of the true elasticity, together with a 45-degree line. The overall impression is that the housing
wealth share matches the true elasticity closely. Looking more closely, the relationship is slightly curved, rather
than linear. The relationship is flat for those with low housing wealth share because these households are
typically young, and the housing wealth share increasingly misses out collateral effects at lower values. For
higher values of the housing wealth share, the housing wealth share approximation is slightly above the true
elasticity on average, because the true elasticity is brought down by transactions costs. At values of the housing
wealth share that are higher still, the housing wealth share matches the true elasticity more closely again.
This is because those with a large housing wealth share are generally closer to the threshold of the adjustment
decision, and consequently have a higher elasticity.
the fact that deposit requirements were generally lower than the 10% imposed in the model, and the availability of credit cards gives
households extra debt capacity, which again is not reflected in the model.
39To remove numerical error, these plots use smoothed measures of these variables. Specifically I use predicted values from
regressions of the elasticity and the approximation on an interaction of age with cubic polynomial interactions of all the state
variables.
40I remove those aged between 25 and 30 to allow a ‘burn-in’ for the simulations. In particular, even though I match the initial
distribution of homeownership, housing wealth and liquid wealth quite closely, most simulated households are not at their optimal
house value, and there is quite a lot of turnover in the housing market in the first couple of years.
41In fact, if I introduce retirees then the approximation matches the true elasticity much more closely because these households
face no income risk and so behave almost like PIH consumers for whom the approximation is exact.
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Figure 9: Accuracy of Approximations






































Notes: Each plot is produced by pooling the sample of 30-65 year olds and splitting homeowners into ventiles according to each
approximation. I then compute the average value of the approximation and the average value of the true elasticity. Beforehand, the
approximations and the true elasticity are smoothed to remove numerical error. See text for more details.
For comparison, on the right hand side I show exactly the same computation, but using BGLV’s approximation
to replace the housing wealth share measure. In general, and in terms of pure correlation, BGLV’s approximation
is much closer to the true elasticity than the housing wealth share. A raw correlation of the true elasticity with
the BGLV approximation for the entire population is 0.94, while the correlation with the housing wealth share
is 0.90.42 However, BGLV’s approximation is further away from the true elasticity in terms of raw magnitudes.
Here the effect of transactions costs drives a wedge between the BGLV and the true elasticity. In fact while
the coefficient from a regression of the true elasticity on the housing wealth share approximation is 0.94, the
coefficient from the regression of the true elasticity on BGLV’s approximation is 0.80.
I explore the accuracy of 𝜓𝐻 as an approximation further in figure 10. The figure shows the approximation
against the true elasticity across various aspects of the state space. The top left grid shows both measures across
the income grid. The top right shows both measures across the grid of house value. Here, the value at zero
gives the elasticity for renters. The bottom two plots split the simulated population into ventiles of ‘voluntary
equity’. As is standard, voluntary equity is a measure of cash-on-hand and equals the sum of financial wealth
and mortgage capacity. The bottom right also shows voluntary equity, but now only for homeowners. The
bottom two plots differ mainly in the mix of households who have low equity. Those with low equity in the
left-hand plot combine renters and homeowners who are constrained, while the equivalent group on the right
hand side omits renters and consequently has a far higher average elasticity. Overall, this figure shows that
the wealth share measure captures the true elasticity reasonably well across most aspects of the state space.
Overall, I conclude from this exercise that the wealth-share approximation does a good job of matching the true
elasticity across much of the population.
42For the prime aged sample studied, these correlations are slightly lower at 0.87 for BGLV’s approximation, and 0.78 for the
wealth share approximation.
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Voluntary Equity - Homeowners
Notes: Plots show pooled simulations of 30-65 year olds. Income plot shows the 11 income grid points. House value plot shows a
split of simulated homeowners into 40 bins. Voluntary equity plots show a split of simulated households into 20 bins. In terms of
model variables voluntary equity is defined as 𝐴+ (1− Ξ) 1−𝛿
𝑅
𝑝𝐻𝐻: financial wealth plus mortgage capacity.
5.3 Quantifying the Role of Collateral Constraints
Although the wealth share elasticity matches the true elasticity fairly well, I can use the model simulations to
capture discrepancies in the approximation and to extend the analysis in section 4. My approach is to use a
model-based elasticity which can be taken back to the data. This approach therefore complements the main
approximation developed in section 2 which is derived from theory.
To keep with the spirit of the paper, I do this in a simple, linear way. I use the following estimating equation
on homeowners:
𝜔𝐻,𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝜓
𝐻
𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒
𝜔
𝑖
where 𝜔𝐻,𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸𝑖 is the true simulated elasticity, 𝜓
𝐻
𝑖 is the housing wealth share, and 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖 is the ratio of net
financial debt to gross housing wealth, again truncated at 0. 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are coefficients, and 𝑒
𝜔
𝑖 is a residual.
Notice two features of this equation: first, and to maintain consistency with the original approximations, the
coefficient on the housing wealth share is restricted to be 1. Second I estimate a common coefficient on leverage
for all working-age households. Of course, I could make the revised approximation more accurate by allowing
time-varying coefficients or, more generally, by allowing for fully flexible functional forms for all state variables.
However, such an approach would be out of keeping with the spirit of the paper. The model based elasticity
used here is transparent and informative.43
In terms of results, 𝛽1 is estimated to be 0.24.
44 Before taking these estimates to the data I examine their effect
on helping the approximation match the true elasticity across the state space. I therefore show the revised
approximation alongside the true elasticity across various aspects of the state space in figure 11. It shows
43I also used an indicator of being close to constraints, as in that used in the calibration exercise above. The results are very
similar. I favour using the linear leverage indicator for ease of interpretation.
44𝛽0 is estimated to -0.12. This value mainly reflects the effect of transactions costs on the true elasticity.
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Voluntary Equity - Homeowners
Notes: See notes to figure 10.
broadly that the revised elasticity matches the true elasticity better across all dimensions of the space shown,
and particularly for homeowners with low voluntary equity.
Finally, I use the estimated effect of leverage to return to the computations in section 4. Specifically I revise
the moments used in equations 15 and 16. These become:
ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) ≈ Contribution from Income + 𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov
(︁
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𝜓𝐻𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑡−1
)︁
⏟  ⏞  
Contribution from Housing
where I gloss over the contributions from income for ease of exposition. Put simply, I revise the approximated
elasticity from 𝜓𝐻𝑡 to 𝜓
𝐻
𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡. Similarly to the exercise in section 4 I plug in the relevant statistics and
compute the contribution to growth in excess consumption inequality. The numbers are shown in table 4.
Again, the first column shows the estimated above-trend growth in consumption inequality in the peak years
of the boom. The second column now shows the total contribution arising from inequality in housing wealth
share, taken from table 2 in section 4. The third column shows the contribution arising from dispersion in
leverage across the population. To calculate this contribution I compute not only the covariance of leverage
with consumption but also the covariance with current income, as a proxy for permanent income. I do this
because figures 6 and 7 indicate that the covariance of income with leverage is more quantitatively important
than with the housing wealth share. In fact, for the 1960’s cohort, the contribution from the covariance of
leverage with consumption is a little over 0.7 log points while the (negative) contribution from the covariance
of leverage with income is under 0.4 log points. The third column of table 4 therefore shows that the overall
contribution from leverage is positive, but small. The final column shows the revised estimates of the fraction
of total excess inequality growth explained by housing market factors. These numbers are slightly larger, but
very similar, to those shown in table 2 in section 4.
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Table 4: Contribution of House Price Shocks to Consumption Inequality: Including Collateral
Effects
Cohort Accumulated Total contribution to excess growth, % contribution of
shock growth to log points: observed total
house prices wealth share leverage excess growth∑︀
𝑡 𝜁𝑡
1950s 0.46 (58%) 1.9 0.1 48.6
1960s 0.46 (58%) 1.7 0.4 36.1
Notes: The observed excess growth in consumption inequality over 1997-2004 was 4.1 log points
for the 1950s cohort and 5.8 log points for the 1960s cohort. ‘Excess’ growth in consumption
inequality is defined as growth in the variance of log consumption over and above the covariance of
log consumption with log income.
5.4 Allowing for Additional Model Features
As a final exercise, I introduce additional features into the benchmark model discussed in section 5, to test
the robustness of the approximation. I explore extensions in two directions. First, I explore model properties
when dropping the assumption of a constant rent-price ratio. Second, I drop the assumption of intra-temporal
homotheticity, and allow the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing to deviate from 1.
Compared to the models I analyse here, therefore, my approximations are now based on a version of the model
that is far simpler. Nevertheless, here I show that my main results hold. In fact, if anything, the analysis here
strengthens my main conclusions.
The first extension is motivated by the discussion in section 2: the available evidence implies that the rent-price
ratio in the UK has been far from stable. The rent-price ratio is in fact markedly counter-cyclical; housing
rents stay fairly constant as house prices rise, and consequently the rent-price ratio falls. I therefore change the
model by assuming that the rental price stays on trend despite any house price change. In fact, rental prices
themselves rise when house prices rise, so compared to the benchmark model, the modelling here provides an
extreme in the opposite direction. Introducing a constant rental price makes the computation more difficult
because the house price must be re-introduced as a state variable. To simplify the computation I set growth in
house prices in all the extensions in this subsection to 0%.45 Accordingly, the model is recalibrated, because
even holding house price growth constant, a constant rental price makes renting more attractive relative to
the benchmark. Hence, using the same parametrization as in section 5 would imply a counter-factually low
homeownership rate. The values of the re-calibrated parameters are shown in appendix table A2.
I show the result of this and the other extensions in figure 12, which builds on figure 9 by showing the relationship
between my housing wealth share approximation and the true elasticity for the simulated population. To frame
the results, the top left panel of figure 12 replicates the result from figure 9, showing the relationship between
the housing wealth share and the true elasticity using the main model from section 5. The top right panel
of figure 12 then shows the relationship between these two measures in the model with constant rental prices.
45Details of the computation of the model extensions are discussed alongside the computation of the benchmark model in appendix
D.
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Again, the figure splits the simulated population into renters, and, for homeowners, into ventiles of the housing
wealth share distribution. The striking result from the figure is that the house price elasticity is pushed up
for everyone. This result arises because a house price increase shifts more households towards renting, which
becomes comparatively cheaper. For existing homeowners in particular a shift to renting releases a substantial
amount of liquid assets, which boosts consumption. A similar affect arises for renters: when house prices
rise they lose the incentive to save for a home, and so increase immediate consumption. For these reasons,
these results should be taken with a note of caution: this simple extension does not capture the fact that
homeownership itself is procyclical. Therefore to capture a rise in homeownership when house prices rise likely
requires model features which are beyond the scope of the current paper. However, to the extent that this simple
model extension captures cyclicalities in rent-price ratios, we see both that the housing wealth share remains a
good approximation of the true elasticity, and that there is little effect on the implications for inequality.
The bottom row of figure 12 shows results when I change the specification for preferences. Both these figures
use the calibration used for the current version of the benchmark displayed in the top left corner. In terms
of preferences, the literature has found varied estimates for the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and housing, and there is as yet no agreement as to whether these two goods are gross substitutes or gross
complements.46 The bottom left hand of figure 12 uses 𝜏 = 0.8, which makes consumption and housing mild
complements. With these preferences, holding fixed the wealth effect, a house price increase causes households
to increase their expenditure on housing, and to decrease their non-housing consumption. Accordingly, it shows
that the total elasticity is now lower than the housing wealth share approximation. However, most importantly,
the gradient of the true elasticity with respect to the housing wealth share is now even closer to 1. This implies
that using the housing wealth share accurately captures the effect on consumption inequality, even if the effect
on the consumption aggregate is more muted.
The bottom right hand panel uses 𝜏 = 1.2, which makes consumption and housing mild substitutes. In contrast
to the bottom left hand panel, the consumption response for renters to a positive house price shock is now
positive. The true consumption elasticity for all households is now raised compared to the benchmark, although
the gradient of the true elasticity with respect to the housing wealth share is now a little below 1.
To conclude, it seems therefore, in terms of the relationship between house prices and consumption inequality,
the effect of house price shocks is largest when housing and consumption are complements, i.e. when 𝜏 is less
than 1. Moreover the effect of house prices on consumption inequality is little changed when rental prices are
smoother. In fact, overall, it seems that the same pattern emerges; the housing wealth share gives a good
indication of the true elasticity across its distribution, and across a variety of models.
6 The Effect of House Price Shocks on Estimates of Income Risk
A main motivation for this study is to see how allowing for asset price shocks affects estimates of income risks.
I therefore estimate the model specified by formulae 14-16 both allowing for the effect of house price shocks
46As two recent examples, Li, Liu, Yang, and Yao (2016) find an elasticity of substitution of around 0.5, while Piazzesi, Schneider,
and Tuzel (2007) find a value of 1.25.
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Figure 12: True Elasticity vs Housing Wealth Share: Additional Model Features























































Elasticity of Substitution = 0.8



















Elasticity of Substitution = 1.2
Notes: Each plot is produced by pooling the sample of 30-65 year olds and splitting homeowners into ventiles according to each
approximation. I then compute the average value of the approximation and the average value of the true elasticity. Beforehand, the
approximations and the true elasticity are smoothed to remove numerical error. See text for more details.
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and then re-estimating, imposing all effects to be zero. Here, I just take into account the impact on inequality
arising from wealth effects; the results in section 5 imply that taking into account collateral effects would yield
quantitatively very similar results. I use the minimum distance procedure discussed in section 3, and, in more
detail, in appendix E.
Figure 13 gives estimates of the variances of permanent income shocks under both strategies. The estimates
are given in roughly 5-year averages to show trends at medium frequencies. I have also chosen the bands to
match different periods in the housing market. Looking broadly at the series, the figure shows that the variance
of permanent shocks is higher for the 1950s cohort than for the 1960s cohort on average. This result reflects
the fact that inequality grew quicker for the older cohort on all measures over the sample period. It is also
noticeable that the estimates show a dip in the variance around the turn of the millennium for the 1950s cohort
followed by a small spike after 2005. In fact, these estimates are likely biased by the effects of a prominent
sequence of tax and benefit changes arriving in the late 1990s. As figure 3 above shows, inequality measures
were compressed after the turn of the millennium for both cohorts and then rebounded. This profile arose
because of redistributive reforms introduced from 1998 onwards by a new centre-left government, the effect of
which were eroded after around 2003.47 I could therefore improve the estimates of income risks by taking these
reforms, and their erosion, into account. Ignoring these factors, however, does not detract from the point of
this section, which is to assess the role of house-price shocks on the income risk estimates.
I now turn to the difference between the estimates when allowing and when not allowing for housing wealth
shocks. Broadly speaking, when housing shocks are included, the implied variances of permanent income shocks
are pushed up during the housing market slump in the early 1990s and down during the boom around 2000.
In the boom, for example, when the house price increases are excluded, then growth in consumption inequality
is mis-attributed to a high variance of permanent shocks. Conversely, the new estimates are higher at the
beginning of the period when house prices were declining. During these early years, house price declines had
a downwards effect on consumption inequality. Therefore, the level of permanent shocks must have been quite
high to induce the actual growth in consumption inequality that is observed.
In terms of comparing the estimates with and without house price shocks, the magnitudes are not large in any
particular year, but accumulate over a prolonged house price boom or slump. For example, for the recession
of the early 1990s, including housing wealth effects increases the estimates of yearly permanent shocks for
the 1950s cohorts by around 0.25 log points. This is around 30% of the estimated average yearly variance of
permanent shocks for the 1950s cohort, or 40% of the average variance in the early 1990s only. Alternatively,
we can quantify the differences by considering how they accumulate over time. For example when examining
the income process over the peak years of the house price boom, over 1997-2004, then ignoring the effect of
house price shocks leads us to overstate the effect of permanent income shocks by a cumulative 1.2 log points
over the period for the 1950s cohort. In other words we would erroneously attribute inequality movements to a
set of permanent income shocks with a standard deviation of 11% of income.
The effect of including house price shocks on estimates of the growth of the variance of transitory shocks is
not shown here, but is roughly equal and opposite to the effect on the permanent shock estimates. This is
47An earlier working paper of the current study, Etheridge (2013), examines the effect of these reforms in detail.
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Figure 13: Estimates of Variances of Permanent Shocks

















because the growth in the variance of transitory shocks is largely explained by ‘extra’ growth in the variance of
log income: that is, growth that is not generated by shocks to permanent income. Therefore, given any path
for the variance of log income, when the estimated variance of shocks to permanent income is higher, then the
corresponding estimates of the growth of variance of transitory shocks must be lower.
Before concluding, it is worth relating these results to standard estimates in the literature. Blundell et al. (2013)
use the same dataset also to study the 1950s cohort alongside those born in the 1940s for the period up to the
mid 1990s. They show that the 1950s cohort, in particular, experienced a spike in the variance of permanent
shocks during recessions, such as that in the early 1990s. The spike they observe in the early 1990s is smoothed
out in the profiles presented here. However, one result of the analysis here is that, taking into account housing
wealth effects increases the spike in the estimated variance of permanent shocks in this recession even further.
7 Conclusions
Across much of the world, house prices have fluctuated wildly in the past 30 years, seemingly in connection
with the wider macroeconomy, and in particular, aggregate consumption. Given that housing wealth and home
ownership are unevenly distributed, it seems important to ask not only how house price shocks affect mean
consumption, but also how they affect consumption inequality. This paper is the first to examine the effect of
large house price swings on inequality in living standards.
In this paper I have used a standard but detailed model of choices over housing and consumption. I have
developed a theoretical framework for capturing several channels through which house price shocks affect various
inequality measures. A strength of my main analysis is that it accounts not only for wealth effects but also
income and substitution effects. A further strength of my approach is that this framework is developed for
general classes of preferences. While I focus in this study on Cobb-Douglas preferences, my application could
be extended more widely. Finally I show how to extend this theoretical framework to account for effects arising
from collateral constraints, using a simulation-based approach.
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The empirical application shows that inequality movements were large over the period I study, and that they
coincide strongly with house price movements exactly as is predicted by the theory. Moreover, my approximated
model can capture a large fraction of the inequality movements quantitatively. I show that collateral effects
work in the same direction as wealth effects, but are quantitatively smaller. Finally, my framework is used to
develop better estimates of income risks from cross-sectional data. This is important because, over an entire life,
the factor that affects household welfare the most is success in the labour market. However, identifying different
types of income risks remains an econometric challenge. I show that accounting for house price movements
changes the implied contribution of permanent and transitory risks. In particular, when house prices decline,
then ignoring house price movements can lead estimates of permanent income risks to be understated.
The present study addresses inequality within observable categories: within regions and within age groups.
Since the financial crisis, in the UK and elsewhere, the most important drivers of inequality have been across
age groups and across regions. These inequalities are influenced in part by the housing market. This role of
the housing market would benefit from further research.
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Online Appendices to ‘House Prices and
Consumption Inequality’
A Appendix: Approximating Changes to Consumption and Housing Ex-
penditures
In this appendix I derive an expression for shocks to non-housing consumption in the presence of income and
house price risk. The proof builds on those in Blundell, Low, and Preston (2013) (henceforth referred to as
BLP) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016).
The proof involves two steps: first characterizing shocks to consumption, housing choices and income, and
second, equating these shocks by examining the expenditure account and the income account of the distribution
of (the log of) future life-time resources. Throughout the derivation, I generally ignore 2nd- and higher-order
terms in the approximations. See BLP for a detailed discussion of these. As a final point, through most of
the derivation I suppress 𝑖 subscripts: when solving the household’s problem in a life-cycle framework, the
distinction between idiosyncratic and common variables is not important.
A.1 The Refined Model










where 𝛽 is a subjective rate of time preference, assumed to be common across households. 𝐻𝑘 is the housing
choice in period 𝑘 ≥ 𝑡, 𝐶𝑘 the non-housing consumption choice, and 𝑢 () is the per-period felicity function. A




, where 𝑎 is the share
of expenditure on non-housing consumption and 𝛾 captures preferences for intertemporal substitution. Note
that compared to the preferences described in section 1, the household does not value bequests. As discussed
in section 1, and given the preferences for bequests described there, this omission is without loss of generality
and simplifies the exposition.





where 𝜁𝐻𝑡 is the shock to (log) house prices with E𝑡−1𝑒𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 = 1 and 𝜇 is a constant.
Here I examine a model with home-ownership only, and no renting. The model with renting (and without
home-ownership) has the same solution and is conceptually simpler. The flow budget constraint in the current
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model is
𝐴𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 𝐻𝑡 = 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑡 + (1− 𝛿) 𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝐻𝑡−1 (18)
where 𝐴𝑡 is liquid wealth at time 𝑡, 𝑌𝑡 is income, 𝑅 the return on liquid wealth and 𝛿 is depreciation on housing.
Income evolves as in the standard permanent-transitory model:
ln𝑌𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡𝜙𝑡 + ln𝑃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (19)
ln𝑃𝑡 = ln𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡
such that 𝑃𝑡 is permanent productivity level, 𝑋𝑡 captures household observable characteristics and 𝑋𝑡𝜙𝑡 is the
deterministic component of income based on these characteristics. The innovations 𝜖𝑡 and 𝜈𝑡+𝑘 have mean zero
and are independent of each another for all 𝑘.

















subject to 17, 18, 19 and some exogenous deterministic process for 𝑋𝑡 which is left unspecified. I characterize
the value function differently in appendix D, where I discuss computation.
A.2 Approximate Growth Equations for Consumption and for Housing
With intertemporally separable preferences, the standard arguments of log-linearization apply. I now write
𝑐𝑡 ≡ ln𝐶𝑡, and ℎ𝑡 ≡ ln𝐻𝑡. Letting 𝜆𝑡 be the marginal utility of wealth we have the standard Euler equation
𝜆𝑡 = E𝑡 (𝛽𝑅𝜆𝑡+1) (20)
which follows from the the first-order condition on 𝐴𝑡 and the envelope condition on 𝐴𝑡 at time 𝑡+ 1.
Using a first-order approximation (see, for example Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten) we obtain that
Δ ln𝜆𝑡+1 ≈ Γ𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜐𝜆𝑡+1 (21)
where Γ𝜆𝑡+1 is the predictable change to the marginal utility of wealth and 𝜐
𝜆
𝑡+1 is the unpredictable innovation.
The first-order conditions further imply:
𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡
and






= 𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝜆𝑡 (22)
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where 𝑢𝑥 () is the partial derivative of 𝑢 () with respect to argument 𝑥. We can insert equations 17 and 20 into
equation 22 to obtain the following expression:
𝑢𝐻 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = 𝑝
𝐻













=⇒ 𝑢𝐻 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡𝑝𝐻𝑡
(︁










=⇒ 𝑢𝐻 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡𝑟𝐻𝑡









These FOCs imply that
Δ ln𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) = Δ ln𝜆𝑡+1 (23)
and




≈ 𝜇+ 𝜁𝐻𝑡+1 +Δ ln𝜆𝑡+1
where 𝜁𝐻𝑡+1 is the shock to the price of housing services, discussed, amongst elsewhere, alongside equations 10










Substituting expression 21 into expression 23 gives
Δ ln𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) ≈ Γ𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜐𝜆𝑡+1 (24)
and similarly
Δ ln𝑢𝐻 (𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) ≈ Γ𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜐𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜇+ 𝜁𝐻𝑡+1
Expanding 𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) around 𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) gives
𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) ≈ 𝑢𝐶 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) + 𝑢𝐶𝐶 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡)𝐶𝑡Δ𝑐𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝐶𝐻 (𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡)𝐻𝑡Δℎ𝑡+1














where the abbreviated notation on the last line is used to save space.
Similarly
























































where 𝑝𝐶 is the price of non-housing consumption (= 1 at time 𝑡 because non-housing consumption is the
numeraire), and 𝜂𝑥,𝑦 is the Frisch elasticity of good 𝑥 w.r.t price 𝑦, assumed constant across individuals and























Notice further from expression 26 that the pure (marginal-utility constant) substitution effect of a shock to house
prices on non-housing consumption is 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 . The pure substitution effect away from housing is −𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 𝜁𝐻𝑡 .





then 𝛾 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the consumption-housing composite and −𝑢𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑢𝐶 = 1 +
𝑎 (𝛾 − 1) is the coefficient on consumption alone. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) on con-
sumption is therefore − 𝑢𝐶𝑢𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
1
1+𝑎(𝛾−1) .













𝜐𝜆𝑡 − 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 𝜁𝐻𝑡












)︀ (︀Δ𝑐𝑡 − 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 (︀𝜇+ 𝜁𝐻𝑡 )︀)︀− 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 (︀𝜇+ 𝜁𝐻𝑡 )︀
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)︁ = 1 and so, in this case






Similarly, in terms of innovations,











)︀ (︀Δ𝑐𝑡 − 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 𝜁𝐻𝑡 )︀− 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 𝜁𝐻𝑡
in the non-homothetic case.
A.3 Approximating Lifetime Resources
As in BLP I define a function 𝐹 : R𝑁+1 → R by 𝐹 (𝜉) = ln
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=0 exp(𝜉𝑗). By exact Taylor expansion around an
arbitrary point 𝜉0 ∈ R𝑁+1
































𝑗 is constant, and 𝜉 lies between 𝜉 and 𝜉0.
A.3.1 Approximating the expenditure account of lifetime resources
I now examine the lifetime budget constraint, which must hold in addition to the flow budget constraint in









𝑞𝑘−𝑡𝑌𝑘 +𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 (28)
where 𝐴𝑡−1 is the level of liquid assets left at period 𝑡 − 1, 𝑝𝐻𝑡 is the house price and ?̃?𝑡 = (1− 𝛿)𝐻𝑡−1 is
the endowment of housing, inherited from the previous period. 𝑅 is the risk-free interest rate on liquid assets,










𝑘 is a generalized rental, or user, price
of housing for 𝑡 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑇 − 1, with E𝑡𝜍𝑘 constant for all 𝑘 and 𝑟𝐻𝑇 = 𝑝𝐻𝑇 . Notice that 𝑟𝐻𝑘 differs from 𝑟𝐻𝑘 defined
above: whereas 𝑟𝐻𝑘 is an expected user cost of housing, 𝑟
𝐻
𝑘 is stochastic at time 𝑘.
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on the left side of equation 28 the logarithm of expected discounted expenditures. Again I write 𝑐𝑡 ≡ ln𝐶𝑡 and
ℎ𝑡 ≡ ln𝐻𝑡. I define:
𝜉𝑘 = 𝑐𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑘𝑟 for 𝑘 = 0, ..., 𝑇 − 𝑡
𝜉0𝑘 = E𝑡−1𝑐𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑘𝑟 for 𝑘 = 0, ..., 𝑇 − 𝑡
𝜉𝑘 = ℎ𝑡+𝑘 + ln 𝑟
𝐻
𝑡+𝑘
− 𝑘𝑟 for 𝑘 = 𝑇 − 𝑡+ 1, ..., 2 (𝑇 − 𝑡) + 1
𝜉0𝑘 = E𝑡−1ℎ𝑡+𝑘 + E𝑡−1 ln 𝑟
𝐻
𝑡+𝑘
− 𝑘𝑟 for 𝑘 = 𝑇 − 𝑡+ 1, ..., 2 (𝑇 − 𝑡) + 1
where 𝑘 = 𝑘 − (𝑇 − 𝑡+ 1) and 𝑟 = 𝑅 − 1 ≈ ln𝑅. Applying the approximation formula in 27, ignoring second-













































ℎ𝑡+𝑗 + ln 𝑟𝐻𝑡+𝑗
)︁
− 𝑗𝑟]









with 𝑠𝐶𝑡 + 𝑠
𝐻




𝑡 give the expected life-time budget shares for consumption and for housing.
A.3.2 Approximating the income account of lifetime resources
Similarly to above, we now expand the income account around 𝒦𝑦 = ln
∑︀𝑇𝑤−𝑡
𝑗=0 E𝑡−1𝑞𝑗𝑌𝑡+𝑗+𝑅𝐴𝑡−1+E𝑡−1𝑝𝐻𝑡 ?̃?𝑡,
the logarithm of expected discounted incomes. I write 𝑦𝑡 ≡ ln𝑌𝑡 and ℎ̃𝑡 ≡ ln ?̃?𝑡. Letting 𝑁 = 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑡 + 1, I
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define:
𝜉𝑗 = 𝑦𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟
𝜉0𝑗 = E𝑡−1𝑦𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟
𝜉𝑁 = ln𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑟
𝜉0𝑁 = ln𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑟
𝜉𝑁+1 = ln 𝑝
𝐻
𝑡 + ℎ̃𝑡
𝜉0𝑁+1 = E𝑡−1 ln 𝑝𝐻𝑡 + ℎ̃𝑡
Applying the approximation formula in 27, ignoring higher-order terms and taking expectations with respect

























1− 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1
)︀
[E𝐼 ln𝐴𝑡−1 − E𝑡−1ln𝐴𝑡−1]
where
𝛼𝑡+𝑗 ≡
exp [E𝑡−1𝑦𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟]∑︀𝑇𝑤−𝑡
𝑘=0 exp [E𝑡−1𝑦𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑗𝑟]
𝜋𝑡 ≡
∑︀𝑇𝑤−𝑡















Intuitively, 𝛼𝑡+𝑗 is an annuitization factor for income for which
∑︀𝑇𝑤−𝑡
𝑗=0 𝛼𝑡+𝑗 = 1, 𝜋𝑡 is the share of human capital
wealth in lifetime wealth, 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1 is the share of housing wealth in lifetime wealth, and Λ𝑡 is total discounted lifetime
wealth itself.
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A.4 Equating Innovations to the Expenditure and Income Accounts
Due to the lifetime budget constraint, the distributions of income and expenditure accounts can be equated
with respect to any information set, ℐ. Applying the operator E𝑡 − E𝑡−1 to the expenditure account:







≈ (E𝑡 − E𝑡−1) ∘ 𝒦𝑒 +
𝑇−𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0





(E𝑡 − E𝑡−1) ∘
(︀












(E𝑡 − E𝑡−1) ∘
(︀





















1− 𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 − 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻
)︀
𝜁𝐻𝑡 (29)
as long as 𝑢 () is homothetic.48 Similarly applying the operator E𝑡−E𝑡−1 to the income account and rearranging:
(E𝑡 − E𝑡−1)∘ ln
(︁∑︀𝑇−𝑡
𝑗=0 𝑞







𝛼𝑡+𝑗 [(E𝑡 − E𝑡−1) ∘ 𝑦𝑡+𝑗 ] + 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1
[︁









where (E𝑡 − E𝑡−1) ∘ ℎ̃𝑡 = 0 because the housing endowment carried forward into time 𝑡 is known after the
realization of shocks at time 𝑡− 1.
Equating expressions 29 and 30, and solving in terms of total changes to log consumption, gives
Δ𝑐𝑡 ≈ Γ𝐶𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 (𝜈𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝜖𝑡) + 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1𝜁𝐻𝑡 + 𝑠𝐻𝑡
(︀
𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 + 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 − 1
)︀
𝜁𝐻𝑡
where Γ𝐶𝑡 is the predictable gradient on consumption, absorbing not only Γ
𝜆
𝑡 above, but also the shift towards
non-housing consumption owing to trend house-price increases.
I now decompose the effect of the house price shock into endowment, income and substitution effects. The
endowment effect is given by 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 . The income effect, when preferences are homothetic, is −𝑠𝐻𝑡 𝜁𝐻𝑡 to first








































Δ𝑐𝑡 ≈ Γ𝐶𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡(𝜈𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝜖𝑡) +






)︀⏟  ⏞  
Substitution
effect




as in equation 13. In the Cobb-Douglas benchmark, then 𝜂𝐻,𝑝𝐻 +𝜂𝐶,𝑝𝐻 = 1, so the substitution effect reduces to
𝑠𝐻𝑡 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 = (1− 𝑎) 𝜁𝐻𝑡 . In this case the income effect cancels out the substitution effect and changes to consumption
are driven by the endowment effect alone.
Finally, in the non-homothetic case, then we can write





























B Appendix: Deriving the Approximate Cross-Sectional Covariance Struc-
ture of Income and Consumption
Here I derive the formulae for changes to the variance of consumption and covariance of income and consumption.
Now we assume that the house price shock is common to all households. Throughout the following derivations,
all variances, covariances and expectations are taken cross-sectionally over households, 𝑖. Therefore I use the
notation Var (𝑥𝑡) to denote the variance of 𝑥𝑖𝑡, and Cov (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) for the covariance of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 with 𝑦𝑖𝑡.
Adapting the notation from appendix A, let 𝜐𝐶𝑖𝑡 be the period-𝑡 idiosyncratic shock to consumption; 𝜐
𝑖𝑛𝑐
𝑖𝑡 the
shock to income. As before 𝜁𝐻𝑡 is the house price shock; 𝜈𝑖𝑡 the permanent shock to income, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 the transitory
shock to income. Then, when preferences are Cobb-Douglas:
𝜐𝐶𝑖𝑡 ≈ 𝜋𝑖𝑡(𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝜖𝑖𝑡) + 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1𝜁𝐻𝑡
𝜐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑡 +Δ𝜖𝑡
I frequently use of the following formula from Goodman (1960), that for independent variables:
Var(𝑥𝑦) = E2(𝑥)Var(𝑦) + E2(𝑦)Var(𝑥) + Var(𝑥)Var(𝑦)
I also frequently use the formula in Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969), that for any three variables:
Cov(𝑥𝑦, 𝑣) = E(𝑥)Cov(𝑦, 𝑣) + E (𝑦) Cov(𝑥, 𝑣) + E(?̃?𝑦𝑣)
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Where 𝑧 = 𝑧 −E𝑧. Specifically, if one of 𝑣, 𝑥 or 𝑦 has zero mean and is independent of the other two variables,
then Cov(𝑥𝑦, 𝑣) = 0.49
Finally, I also assume that the predictable change to consumption Γ𝐶𝑖𝑡 is common across households within a
cohort. See BLP for a further discussion.
B.1 Deriving an Expression for ΔVar(𝑐𝑡)
I drop 𝑖 subscripts to avoid clutter. By simple re-arrangement:
ΔVar(𝑐𝑡) = Var(𝑐𝑡−1 +Δ𝑐𝑡)−Var(𝑐𝑡−1)


















where the last line follows from the first by application of Goodman’s formula.
2Cov(𝑐𝑡−1,Δ𝑐𝑡) ≈ 2Cov
(︀












= 2𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝑐𝑡−1, 𝜓
𝐻
𝑡−1)


















as in expression 16 in the main text.
B.2 Deriving an Expression for ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)
We have:
ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) = Cov(𝑐𝑡−1 +Δ𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1 +Δ𝑦𝑡)− Cov(𝑐𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−1)
= Cov(𝑐𝑡−1,Δ𝑦𝑡) + Cov(Δ𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1) + Cov(Δ𝑐𝑡,Δ𝑦𝑡)
49Suppose, for example, 𝑥 is independent of 𝑦 and 𝑣 and has zero mean. Then E(𝑥) = Cov(𝑥, 𝑣) = 0 and E(?̃?𝑦𝑣) = E(𝑥𝑦𝑣) =
E(E(𝑥𝑦𝑣|𝑦𝑣)) = E(𝑦𝑣E(𝑥|𝑦𝑣)) = 0. The argument follows similarly if either 𝑦 or 𝑣 is independent of the other two variables and has
zero mean.
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Looking at each term in sequence:
Cov(𝑐𝑡−1,Δ𝑦𝑡) = Cov(𝑐𝑡−1, 𝜈𝑡 +Δ𝜖𝑡)
= Cov(𝑐𝑡−1,−𝜖𝑡−1)
≈ −?̄?𝑡−1𝛼𝑡−1Var(𝜖𝑡−1)
And for the 2nd term:
Cov(Δ𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1) ≈ Cov(𝜋𝑡(𝜈𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝜖𝑡) + 𝜓𝐻𝑡−1𝜁𝐻𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡−1) (34)















𝑡 , 𝜈𝑡 +Δ𝜖𝑡
)︀





= ?̄?𝑡Var(𝜈𝑡) + ?̄?𝑡𝛼𝑡Var(𝜖𝑡)− 𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝜖𝑡−1) (35)
Putting this together we get:
ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) ≈ ?̄?𝑡Var(𝜈𝑡) + Δ [?̄?𝑡𝛼𝑡Var(𝜖𝑡)] + 𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−1)− 𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝜖𝑡−1)







where 𝑦𝑃𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜖𝑡 is log permanent income, as in expression 15 in the main text.
C Appendix: Aggregate Income Shocks and an Equilibrium Interpretation
As discussed in the introduction, much of the recent literature has focused on the general equilibrium relationship
between house prices and consumption. One particular focus of the literature has been on equilibrium effects of
changes to credit conditions. Another possibility is that house prices and consumption are correlated because
they are both driven by (revisions to) aggregate income expectations. Consequently, many studies, such as
Campbell and Cocco (2007), allow for a connection between house prices and aggregate income shocks in their
analyses. These aggregate income shocks are the focus of the current appendix. I first assess how aggregate
shocks affect the inequality measures jointly with house price shocks, without considering equilibrium factors.
Given some assumptions on the supply side of the economy I then provide an equilibrium interpretation.
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C.1 The Covariance Structure of Income and Consumption: Extension to Aggregate
Income Shocks
I follow on from sections A and B by extending the model to allow for aggregate shocks to income. I first
consider these in the absence of general equilibrium effects. Specifically, I model aggregate income as a random
walk. I also model interest rates as fixed. I therefore modify the process for household income given by equations
5 and 6 to become
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑡 + ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ln𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁
𝑌
𝑡
where 𝜁𝑌𝑡 is an aggregate, proportional, permanent shock that affects all households equally, and all other terms
are as before. Note that 𝜁𝑌𝑡 is potentially correlated with 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 across time.
The introduction of aggregate shocks does not change the basic formulae for consumption innovations. We
therefore now have:
𝜐𝐶𝑖𝑡 ≈ 𝜋𝑖𝑡(𝜁𝑌𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝜖𝑖𝑡) + 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1𝜁𝐻𝑡
𝜐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜁
𝑌
𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 +Δ𝜖𝑖𝑡
where 𝜁𝑌𝑡 is the aggregate shock to income. The growth in consumption given in expression 13 is updated to
become
Δ𝑐𝑖𝑡 ≈ Γ𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖𝑡(𝜁𝑌𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝜖𝑖𝑡) + 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡−1𝜁𝐻𝑡
Note that the household observes no difference between an idiosyncratic permanent shock 𝜈𝑖𝑡 and the aggregate
shock 𝜁𝑌𝑡 in my (partial) equilibrium framework. Both shocks affect consumption equally.





























































)︀⏟  ⏞  
new terms












= 2Cov (𝑐𝑡−1, 𝜋𝑡(𝜈𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝜖𝑡)) + 2Cov(𝑐𝑡−1, 𝜋𝑡𝜁
𝑌











































+ 2𝜁𝑌𝑡 Cov(𝑐𝑡−1, 𝜋𝑡)⏟  ⏞  
new terms
where I use 𝜎2𝜂 and 𝜎
2
𝜖 to indicate the variances of permanent and transitory innovations, to save space.
The terms for ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) change less. In fact the only changes are that the term in Cov(Δ𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1) in expression
34 becomes larger by the term 𝜁𝑌𝑡 Cov (𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1), and the updated version of expression 35 is smaller by the term








. Therefore the updated version of expression
36 is
ΔCov(𝑐𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) ≈ ?̄?𝑡Var(𝜈𝑡) + Δ [?̄?𝑡𝛼𝑡Var(𝜖𝑡)] + 𝜁𝐻𝑡 Cov(𝜓𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑃𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑌𝑡 Cov(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑃𝑡−1)⏟  ⏞  
new term
The cross-sectional moments therefore contain four new terms. First, the growth in covariance between (log)
consumption and (log) income features the term 𝜁𝑌𝑡 Cov(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦
𝑃
𝑡−1). This term captures the importance of labour
income in life-time wealth across the income distribution. As one example, if all households have the same
asset-to-income ratio, then an aggregate income shock will affect all households equally and this term will be
zero. More generally, this term may be positive or negative. It may be negative if those at the top of the income
distribution have disproportionately more assets and those at the bottom of the income distribution rely more
on their income. Then, a shock to aggregate income would compress the covariance.
Similarly, the growth in the variance of log consumption features the term 2𝜁𝑌𝑡 Cov (𝜋𝑡, 𝑐𝑡−1). This term captures
any difference in the importance of labour income in life-time wealth across the consumption distribution.
Intuitively, and similarly to the case for the covariance with income, suppose, for example, that those at the
bottom of the consumption distribution finance consumption through labour income and have few assets, while
those at the top of the distribution are asset holders. Then an aggregate income shock will cause consumption
inequality to fall.





















, also given in expression 38. They come from an








. Intuitively, these terms capture any raw difference in the importance of
labour income and housing wealth across households, irrespectively of how they are correlated with the con-
sumption distribution. Since these terms are composed of second-order products of 𝜁𝑌𝑡 and 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 , we would expect
them to be less important quantitatively.







: the relationship between income and house price shocks does not directly enter the formulae.
This is because all variances and covariances in these formulae are cross-sectional, and not taken over time. Of
course, in any given period the ex-post shocks 𝜁𝑌𝑡 and 𝜁
𝐻
𝑡 are constants. Nevertheless, any covariance over time
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between these shocks affects the empirical analysis in the following ways: First, the term 𝜁𝐻𝑡 𝜁
𝑌
𝑡 which appears
in equation 38 is more likely to be positive, ex-post, although its importance is likely small. Second, and more
importantly, any correlation should affect households’ initial precautionary saving and housing choices. These
effects will be picked up in the wealth shares observed in the data.
C.2 An Equilibrium Interpretation Under Fixed Housing Supply
We can now consider an equilibrium interpretation of aggregate income and price movements, using some simple
approximating assumptions. First, suppose that housing is in fixed supply. Second, suppose the interest rate is
fixed because we are analysing a small, open economy. The first assumption seems highly appropriate for the
UK, where the rate of house building has remained extremely low. The second assumption is also reasonably
appropriate, although lending conditions presumably deviate away from movements in the risk free rate over
the housing market cycle. Finally, suppose that preferences are Cobb-Douglas. Under these assumptions, an
aggregate income shock, arising from a shock to labour productivity, say, induces an approximately identical
proportionate change to consumption and to house prices.
In this case we can interpret the direct and indirect effect of income shocks on the inequality measures. Ignoring
second-order terms, the direct effect of an income shock on consumption inequality (i.e. excluding house price













, where 𝜓𝑂𝑡−1 is the share of other (non-
housing) wealth in discounted life-time wealth. Similarly, the direct effect of the aggregate income shock on the
covariance measure is Cov(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦
𝑃




𝑡−1). I quantify these effects and discuss
them further in the next subsection. In brief, ignoring second-order terms the effect of aggregate income shocks





(Var(𝜈𝑡) + ...) + 2𝜁
𝑌



















Before finishing this subsection it is worth qualifying this equilibrium interpretation. In particular, I have
assumed that the interest rate is fixed. Of course, as discussed, a number of papers have modelled the relationship
between credit conditions and the housing market, but assessing this channel is beyond the scope of the current
paper. More generally, it is clear from the volatility of prices that factors other than aggregate productivity
must have a more direct role in driving house prices. The puzzling high volatility of house prices is a focus
of the survey chapter by Piazzesi and Schneider (2016). Here, I therefore focus on potentially only a small
component of the factors driving house prices. Nevertheless my exercise is potentially informative in assessing
whether housing-wealth factors exacerbate or attenuate inequality movements arising from prior forces.
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C.3 Results
The previous subsections showed how to adjust the inequality formulae when allowing for shocks to aggregate
income and coincident, or resulting, shocks to house prices. I now modify the empirical analysis to assess the
effect of these shocks on quantities. The reasons for doing this are two-fold. First, I wish to assess the direction
and the magnitude of the bias from ignoring aggregate shocks. Second, and more importantly, I wish to assess
whether, and to what extent, housing wealth effects exacerbate or attenuate other forces driving inequality.
To perform the analysis I measure aggregate income as real households’ disposable income per head from the
national accounts.50 According to this series, household incomes had yearly trend growth of 2.6% over 1955
to 2007. Moreover, household incomes did indeed grow above trend coincidentally with the house price boom.
Compared to house price changes, however, income shocks were small in proportional terms. Income grew by
only a cumulative 3.6% above trend over 1997-2004. In fact, growth in disposable incomes peaked over 1995
to 2001, but even then, it cumulated to only 6.8% above trend. This is much less than the 58% above-trend
growth in house prices.
I now quantify the relevant wealth-share moments given in formulae 37 and 38, and in formula 39. The
empirical counterparts of these moments are shown in table A1. I turn first to expression 39, which decomposes
growth in the variance of log consumption, interpreted in terms of general equilibrium effects. The most
important new wealth-share moment for this inequality measure is Cov (𝜋𝑡, 𝑐𝑡−1). Table A1 gives its empirical
counterpart in the second column. The table shows that these quantities are negative and quantitatively large.
A positive aggregate income shock therefore reduces consumption inequality, because those at the bottom of
the consumption distribution are more reliant on labour income than on other assets, relative to those who are
better off. I quantify the effect on the inequality measure, by performing the same calculation as given in table
2. I find that, for the 1950s cohort, allowing for aggregate income shocks reduces the explained increase in the
variance of log consumption by 2.3% of the observed increase over 1997-2004, a small amount. Similarly, the
corresponding calculation for the 1960s cohort gives 0.3% of the observed increase. I conclude, therefore, that
allowing for aggregate income shocks does not substantially alter the main results.
Although the direct effect of the aggregate income shocks is small, we can nevertheless use the quantities
in provided in table 2 to quantify the equilibrium interpretation. As discussed above, when aggregate income
increases, houses are in fixed supply and preferences are Cobb-Douglas, we should expect an equal proportionate
rise in the relative price of housing. Therefore if the direct effect of an aggregate income shock is to decrease
consumption inequality, because 2Cov (𝜋𝑡, 𝑐𝑡−1) is negative, then house price effects more than offset this factor




is positive and, on average, quantitatively slightly larger.
Of course, this analysis does not take into account the forces that likely have more importance than aggregate
income in driving house prices and, hence, inequality measures.
To complete the analysis, I turn next to growth in the covariance of consumption and income. I have not
shown its role in an equilibrium interpretation, but the effect of coincident shocks is shown in expression 37.
50This is variable INXZ in the income accounts.
66
The relevant wealth-share moment in this decomposition is Cov(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦
𝑃
𝑡−1), the covariance of the human capital
share with permanent income. Again, I assess this using Cov(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1) shown in the table in the third column.
The estimates are insignificant and small, implying that, for a given aggregate income shock, the effect on the
covariance of consumption with income is also small. For completeness, the first and final columns of table A1
give other components relevant to expression 38. As discussed in section C, however, their role in the inequality
measures is negligible.
Table A1: Additional Wealth Share Estimates by Cohort
year Var 𝜋 Cov(𝜋𝑡+1, 𝑐𝑡) Cov(𝜋𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡) Cov(𝜓
𝐻




1995 0.0103 -0.0090 -0.0061 -0.0063 0.0065
(0.0007) (0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0061)
2000 0.0152 -0.0191 -0.0042 -0.0117 0.0156
(0.0012) (0.0062) (0.0031) (0.0010) (0.0067)
2005 0.0348 -0.0154 -0.0021 -0.0277 0.0271
(0.0020) (0.0106) (0.0048) (0.0020) (0.0103)
1960s Cohort
1995 0.0046 -0.0075 0.0005 -0.0040 0.0116
(0.0005) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0036)
2000 0.0060 -0.0105 -0.0038 -0.0056 0.0106
(0.0006) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0041)
2005 0.0160 -0.0133 -0.0020 -0.0143 0.0141
(0.0010) (0.0056) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0074)
Notes: 𝜓𝐻 is the share of housing in lifetime wealth, 𝜋 the share of human capital. 𝑦𝑡 is log residual current income, 𝑓𝑡 is log
residual food. Cov(𝑥𝑡, 𝑐𝑡) is computed as Cov(𝑥𝑡, 𝑓𝑡)/𝜒𝑓 where 𝜒𝑓 is the elasticity of food consumption with respect to total
consumption, taken to be 0.38. See text for more details. Standard errors obtained using a bootstrap with 1000 draws.
D Model Solution, Calibration and Numerical Details
The model used here is very similar to that in Berger et al. (2018). The model is solved using the method
of endogenous grid points extended to discrete choices as discussed in Fella (2014), Iskhakov et al. (2017) and
Clausen and Strub (2013). This method uses the exact solution of the Euler equation and so is numerically
extremely accurate. I first describe computation of the benchmark model described in section 5. Below I
describe computation of the extended models, such as that featuring constant rental prices.
Choices of housing lie on a discrete grid, which is sufficiently fine that I interpret it as continuous. Specifically,
the grid for housing has 40 points. These points are spaced at approximately 5% intervals in the middle of the
state space, and more widely at the extremes. The grid for financial wealth has 100 points. The income grid
has 11 points. I first solve a conditional value function problem for the household: the household maximizes
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consumption given a choice of housing. I then solve for the household’s unconditional value function: the
household maximizes over housing values taking optimal consumption as given.
D.1 Conditional Value Functions
D.1.1 Buyers/Movers
In the following exposition I drop 𝑡 subscripts and use a more compact notation. Therefore 𝑋+1, for example,
denotes the value of 𝑋 in the subsequent period, and 𝑋−1 the value in the previous period. Let ?̄? = 𝑝
𝐻𝐻
















+1 be the shock to house prices. Let 𝑉 be the inherited house
value at the beginning of the period, such that 𝑉 = 𝑥×?̄?−1. Let 𝑌 (𝑧, 𝜖) be income, which depends on permanent
characteristics, here denoted by 𝑧, and the transitory shock 𝜖. Finally let 𝒱𝑂𝑊𝑁 () be the unconditional value
function for owners, discussed later.
It can be shown that the conditional value function for those buying or moving a house takes the following form:













s.t 𝐴+ 𝐶 + ?̄? = 𝑅𝐴−1 + 𝑌 (𝑧, 𝜖) + (1− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿)𝑉
𝐴 ≥ (1− Ξ) 1− 𝛿
𝑅
?̄?, 𝑉+1 = ?̄?𝑥+1, 𝑋+1 = ⟨𝐴, 𝑉+1, 𝑌+1, 𝑗 + 1⟩
Define 𝑊 = 𝐴 + (1− Ξ) 1−𝛿𝑅 ?̄? as end-of-period voluntary equity: a choice variable. We can also define 𝑄 =
𝑅𝐴−1+(1− Ξ) (1− 𝛿)𝑉 +𝑌 (𝑧, 𝜖) as beginning-of-period voluntary equity (including income), a state variable.
This implies we can write the budget constraint as follows:
𝑊 + 𝐶 = 𝑄+
(︂









where 𝑍 () gives total resources available for consumption and saving, given endowments and choices over
housing.
The problem can therefore be written as follows:
𝑉 𝑏𝑢𝑦,?̄? (𝑋) = max
𝐶,𝑊







s.t 𝑊 + 𝐶 = 𝑍, 𝑊 ≥ 0
𝑍 = 𝑄+
(︂




?̄? + (Ξ− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿)𝑉
𝑉+1 = ?̄?𝑥+1, 𝑄+1 = 𝑅𝑊 + (1− Ξ) (1− 𝛿) ?̄? (𝑥+1 − 1) + 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1)
𝑋+1 = ⟨𝑄+1, 𝑉+1, 𝑌+1, 𝑗 + 1⟩
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The algorithm works as in Fella (2014). First we take a grid ?̂? for 𝑊 . Then, using endogenous grid






















which gives values for consumption as a function of housing choice and an
endogenously determined grid of available resources 𝑍.
As a final point note that a difference with the model in Berger et al. (2018) arises in the specification of the
income process, which here has a permanent-transitory, rather than an AR(1), structure. This alteration leads
to a slight difference in the definition of the state variables: here beginning-of-period voluntary equity includes
contemporaneous income.
D.1.2 Renters
For renting, define 𝑊 = 𝐴 as end-of-period voluntary equity: a choice variable. Similarly define 𝑄+1 =
𝑅𝑊 + 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1) = 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1) as beginning-of-period voluntary equity, a state variable. Then the
problem can be written as follows:
𝑉 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑋) = max
𝐶,𝑊,?̄?







s.t 𝑊 + 𝐶 + 𝜒?̄? = 𝑍, 𝑊 ≥ 0
𝑍 = 𝑄+ (Ξ− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿)𝑉
𝑉+1 = 0, 𝑄+1 = 𝑅𝑊 + 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1)
𝑋+1 = ⟨𝑄+1, 𝑉+1, 𝑌+1, 𝑗 + 1⟩
D.1.3 Stayers
Using the same definitions as for buyers we can write the stayer’s problem as follows:
𝑉 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 (𝑋) = max
𝐶,𝑊











((1−𝑅) (1− Ξ) (1− 𝛿)−𝑅𝛿)
𝑉+1 = 𝑉 𝑥+1, 𝑄+1 = 𝑅𝑊 + 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1) + (1− Ξ) (1− 𝛿)𝑉 (𝑥+1 − 1)
𝑋+1 = ⟨𝑄+1, 𝑉+1, 𝑌+1, 𝑗 + 1⟩
When solving the model we do not need to solve explicitly for staying, but can use the solution for buyers. We
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Figure A1: Life-cycle Income Profiles































+ 𝑉 𝜅 (1− 𝛿)
D.2 Unconditional Value Functions
We can then define the value functions for in-coming renters and owners as follows:
𝒱𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇 (𝑋) = max
{︂




𝒱𝑂𝑊𝑁 (𝑋) = max
{︂




D.3 Extra Calibration Details
Figure A1 shows the mean of income and the variance of log income over the life cycle.
D.4 Solution of the Extended Models: Constant Rental Price and Non-Unitary Elasticity
of Substitution
The main change when solving these models is that it becomes impossible to remove the house price as a
state variable. Computation is therefore much slower, although the computational procedures are conceptually
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simpler. For example the conditional value function for a household buying a house of quality 𝐻 is:






s.t 𝑊 + 𝐶 = 𝑍, 𝑊 ≥ 0
𝑍 = 𝑄+
(︂




𝑝𝐻𝐻 + (Ξ− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿) 𝑝𝐻𝐻−1
𝑑−1 ∈ {0, 1}




+ 𝑌 (𝑧+1, 𝜖+1)
𝑋+1 =
⟨︀
𝑄+1, 𝐻, 𝑌+1, 𝑝
𝐻
+1, 𝑗 + 1
⟩︀
where I borrow most notation from the benchmark model. I also define the variable 𝑑 = 0 if the individual
rents at time 𝑡, and 𝑑 = 1 if he buys.
For those choosing to rent, when the rental price is constant (or deterministic) the problem can be written as
follows:






s.t 𝑊 + 𝐶 + 𝜒𝐻 = 𝑍, 𝑊 ≥ 0
𝑍 = 𝑄+ (Ξ− 𝜅) (1− 𝛿) 𝑑−1𝑝𝐻𝐻−1
𝑑−1 ∈ {0, 1}





+1, 𝑗 + 1
⟩︀
In terms of numerical choices, I now use sparser grids. The grid for housing quality has 30 points. These
points are now spaced at approximately 6.5% intervals in the middle of the state space, and more widely at the
extremes. The grid for financial wealth still has 100 points. The income grid now has 9 points. The grid for
house prices has 21 points. This grid is such that the house price elasticities are computed using a price change
of between 2.5% and 5.5%, depending on age.
Table A2 shows the parameters used for calibrating the extended model version with price as a state variable.
The first line (‘Benchmark Re-Calibration’) shows the parameters chosen to hit the lifecycle in the benchmark
model, but with house price growth set to 0. These values are also used in the model extensions where the
elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption is 0.8 and when it is 1.2. The second line (‘Constant
Rental Price’) shows the parameters chosen to hit the lifecycle in the model with constant rental prices. See
Section 5 for a further discussion.
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Table A2: Housing Model Extensions: Parameters Used to Hit Lifecycle
a 𝛽 Φ 𝜒25 𝜒65 𝜒𝑟𝑒𝑡
Benchmark Re-Calibration 0.825 0.953 17.0 0.0505 0.0475 0.048
Constant Rental Price 0.825 0.953 17.0 0.0535 0.053 0.051
Notes: ‘Benchmark Re-Calibration’ refers to the re-calibration using the model with house price as a
state variable and zero house price growth. This calibration is also used when the CES parameter is
chosen to be 1.2 and when it is chosen to be 0.8. ‘Constant Rental Price’ refers to the re-calibration
using the model with constant rental prices, and a stochastic price-to-rent ratio. See Section 5 for
further discussion.
E Appendix: The Minimum Distance Estimator for the Income Process
In this section I describe the asymptotic properties of the estimator used in section 6. Some of the notation
here is recycled from other sections. In particular, 𝑘, 𝑉 , 𝐴 and Ξ are defined differently than elsewhere.
E.1 Model and Data Structure
Let 𝑚 be a 𝑃 x 1 vector of moments from two different data sources (in our application, the FES and BHPS),
with sample sizes 𝑁 and 𝑀 . Let 𝜅 be a 𝑅 x 1 vector of parameters. Our model specifies:
𝑔 (𝑚0, 𝜅0) = 0
where 𝑔 () is a potentially non-separable function of raw moments and parameters and forms a 𝑆 x 1 vector
of moment conditions. In our case 𝑆 = 3𝑇 where 𝑇 is the number of time periods and 𝑔 () consists of all the
empirical counterparts of equations 14, 15 and 16. We seek to estimate 𝜅. In our case, 𝜅 consists of Var (𝜈𝑡),
the variance of permanent shocks and ΔVar (𝜖𝑡), the change in the variance of transitory shocks. Furthermore,
𝑅 = 2𝑇 . More generally, identification requires that 𝑅 ≤ 𝑆.
E.2 Estimation
This situation is as in classical minimum distance estimation except that the raw moments cannot be separated
from the parameters. To derive the estimator and asymptotic statistics I therefore modify the arguments used
in, for example, Wooldridge (2002).
As mentioned, the data in this application come from two sources. I derive asymptotic distributions in the case
where both samples have the same sample size, 𝑁 (=𝑀), letting 𝑁 → ∞.
?̂? solves the first-order condition:
ℋ (?̂?)′A𝑔 (?̂?, ?̂?) = 0
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such that A is a weighting matrix and ℋ(?̂?) ≡ ∇𝜅𝑔(?̂?, 𝜅)|?̂? is the gradient of the objective function with respect
to estimable parameters.













𝑁(?̂?− 𝜅0) + 𝑜𝑝(1)
where ℋ ≡ ∇𝜅𝑔(𝑚0, 𝜅)|𝜅0 and G ≡ ∇𝑚𝑔(𝑚,𝜅0)|𝑚0 .
Combining the expressions above, and using ℋ(?̂?)′ = ℋ′ + 𝑜𝑝(1):
√





𝑁(?̂?−𝑚0) ∼ N(0,V), then:
√




such that Ξ ≡ GVG′.
If used, the optimal weighting matrix is therefore A = Ξ−1 giving:
√




In this study, the identity weighting matrix is used. When using this optimal weighting matrix, however, the
following multi-step procedure is available:
1. Estimate ?̂? as the minimizer of 𝑔 (?̂?, 𝜅)A𝑔 (?̂?, 𝜅), using e.g. A = I𝑆 , the identity matrix.
2. Form Ξ̂ = ĜV̂Ĝ
′
. 𝑉 is obtained from the raw data via a bootstrap. Ĝ can be obtained from ∇𝑚𝑔(𝑚, ?̂?)|?̂?.
3. Estimate ^̂𝜅 as the minimizer of 𝑔 (?̂?, 𝑘) (Ξ̂)−1𝑔 (?̂?, 𝜅).
F Appendix: Data and Extra Results
F.1 Computing Wealth Share Statistics In Years With Incomplete Wealth Information
Wealth shares are available using complete information on financial wealth for 1995, 2000 and 2005. Accordingly
wealth share statistics are computed for these years simply as described in section 3.5. I compute wealth shares
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for the intermediate years as follows. Let ?̂?𝑝 (𝑡) be a statistic for the precise wealth share for time 𝑡: for
example, the covariance of consumption with the housing wealth share. Similarly let ?̂?𝑎 (𝑡) be the statistic for
the approximate wealth share at time 𝑡, which includes mortgage debt, but does not include financial assets.
Then for years between 1995 and 2000 (except for 1996) I interpolate the precise wealth share statistic as












In words I re-weight the approximate wealth share estimate using weights observed in 1995 and 2000. These
weights are linearly interpolated. I perform exactly the same procedure for years between 2000 and 2005.











I compute wealth shares for years before 1995 using data on housing assets and mortgage debt for 1993 and 1994.
I first compute ?̂?𝑎 (𝑡) as the approximate statistic, not including financial assets. I then compute interpolated
statistics as follows:
^̂𝑤𝑝 (𝑡) = ?̂?𝑎 (𝑡)×
?̂?𝑝 (1995)
?̂?𝑎 (1995)
I perform the same procedure for the years after 2005.
F.2 Results for Wealth Share Statistics Assuming Different Discount Factors on Future
Income
Table A3 shows the results of a robustness exercise for the key moments used in section 4. The second and fifth
columns reproduce the results shown in table 1. These columns use a net rate of 4% to discount future income.
The other columns show the key wealth share moments using a low discount rate of 1% and a high discount
rate of 7%.
F.3 Estimating Expected Discounted Lifetime Labour Income Using Different Data Struc-
tures
As discussed in section 2, estimating discounted lifetime labour income presents a number of difficulties. For
example, accurate estimation requires that the income model presented in equations 5 and 6 is correctly specified.
Here I discuss a related version of this challenge caused by the basic identification problem for income: we cannot
distinguish permanent from transitory incomes at the household level, but only observe current income. This
identification problem arises even in long panels. In this appendix I examine estimation under two different data
structures: cross-sectional data, and a short, 2-wave panel. I show that, when estimating the crucial moments,
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Table A3: Robustness of Wealth Share Estimates to Computation of Discounted Life-Time
Income




1% 4% 7% 1% 4% 7%
1950s Cohort
1995 0.0048 0.0065 0.0084 0.0059 0.0079 0.0101
(0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0033)
2000 0.0120 0.0156 0.0184 0.0052 0.0079 0.0097
(0.0056) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0039)
2005 0.0216 0.0271 0.0308 0.0076 0.0092 0.0111
(0.0092) (0.0103) (0.0112) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0050)
1960s Cohort
1995 0.0076 0.0116 0.0162 0.0027 0.0050 0.0086
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0029)
2000 0.0078 0.0106 0.0150 0.0041 0.0061 0.0089
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0026)
2005 0.0125 0.0141 0.0172 0.0009 0.0023 0.0031
(0.0062) (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0037)
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses and obtained using a bootstrap
with 1000 draws. For further details see notes to table 1, and accompanying
text.
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the bias caused by observing current incomes only is second order in the case of the short panel, but somewhat
larger when using a cross-section.






. Estimating this moment requires estimating discounted
lifetime wealth from time 𝑡+1 onwards. The formulation of discounted lifetime labour income used in appendix




exp [E𝑡 ln𝑌𝑖𝑡+1+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟]




exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡+1+𝑗𝜙𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟)
where 𝐿𝑖𝑡+1 is given in terms of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 because 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the relevant component of the households time-𝑡 information
set.
With cross-sectional data we observe current income only. The best we can do is to use time-𝑡 income to
estimate 𝐿𝑖𝑡+1. We must therefore form the following mismeasured estimate of discounted expected lifetime
wealth:
𝐿*𝑖𝑡+1 ≡ exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑤−𝑡−1∑︁
𝑗=0
exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡+1+𝑗𝜙𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟)
= exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡)𝐿𝑖𝑡+1
where 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the time-𝑡 transitory shock. Now suppose we have access to a short panel, as in the current analysis.
We can now use time-𝑡+ 1 income. Define:
𝐿**𝑖𝑡+1 ≡ exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡+1)𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑇𝑤−𝑡−1∑︁
𝑗=0
exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡+1+𝑗𝜙𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑗𝑟)
= exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡+1𝜈𝑖𝑡+1)𝐿𝑖𝑡+1
𝐿**𝑖𝑡+1 is therefore less close than 𝐿
*
𝑖𝑡+1 as an approximation of 𝐿𝑖𝑡+1. As we shall see, however, it provides useful













+ expE𝑡ln (𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝐿*𝑖𝑡+1
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which is the housing wealth share using the short panel.
As discussed, the relevant consideration for the results here is the bias in estimating the covariance of the
mismeasured version of the housing wealth share with log consumption. I define the following variables, recycling
notation from other parts of the appendix. Let:
𝜉𝑖𝑡 = exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡)− E [exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡)]
and
𝜉𝑖𝑡+1 = exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡+1𝜈𝑖𝑡+1)− E [exp (𝜖𝑖𝑡+1𝜈𝑖𝑡+1)]
which are both mean-zero variables.
Applying a second-order Taylor series expansion it is simple to show the following relationships:






















where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 ≡ 1 + 𝜓𝐻𝑖𝑡 .
























































where the second line follows from the first by application of Bohrnstedt’s formula discussed in appendix B,









































= 0, because 𝜉𝑡+1 captures future income shocks. Therefore the error from using current income
is second-order in 𝜉𝑡+1 and likely very small. In the case of the cross-section, the bias captured in expression 40








I briefly attempt to quantify this latter bias. In the quantitative section 5 I used a value for the variance of











, and multiplied by the elasticity of consumption with respect to transitory incomes. The
framework in the present paper implies this latter elasticity is very small. However, the size of the elasticity is
itself a topic of debate. For the sake of this calculation I assume a moderately large value of 0.2. If we then use




(which in fact differs by age) of 0.3, then the bias is around 0.05×0.3×0.2 = 0.003.






is around 0.015, then this implies that the bias when using the
cross-section is around 20% of the true value.
F.4 The Consumption Response to House Price Shocks in the BHPS
Here I show reduced-form evidence on the consumption response to house price shocks using the panel dimension
of the BHPS. The regressions presented here are simple OLS regressions of changes in mortgage holdings and
food expenditure on changes to self-reported household-level house value. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. This evidence is similar to that discussed in Disney et al. (2010) and Crossley, Levell, and Low
(2017).
The results are shown in table A4, which is split into two halves. The left hand side shows the re-mortgage
elasticity. The regressions shown here include a square in age. I have also removed those aged over 55 because
older households are typically unable to access mortgage markets. The regressions also exclude those who have
moved home or who say they have extracted equity to improve their homes. I remove these home improvers
because house values for these households are endogenous to the response variable. The regressions here are
therefore intended to show equity withdrawal intended for non-housing related consumption. The first column
shows results from a raw OLS regression with no extra controls. The second column includes year dummies.
The third column allows for an interaction of the change in house value with a dummy for whether the household
was previously highly levered. Here leverage is defined purely in terms of the mortgage-to-house-value ratio. A
household is considered highly levered if this ratio is above 0.7. The third regression implies that highly levered
households account for much, but not all, of the re-mortgaging.
The right-hand half of the table shows regressions of changes to household residual food expenditure on changes
to house values. All regressions include controls for changes to residual household income. Similarly to the left
half of the table, the first column restricts the sample to those who do not move. The food expenditure elasticity,
at around 0.05, can be re-interpreted as a consumption elasticity if we divide it by the income elasticity of food
expenditure, which is around 0.4. The estimated coefficient therefore implies a raw consumption elasticity of
around 0.12. This estimate is fairly low compared to the literature and that used in the rest of this paper.
However, in this auxiliary evidence, I do not try to control for measurement error and so the estimate is likely
attenuated.
The second column uses only those households that move. As expected, any changes in house values here are
not news to the household and so food expenditure does not respond. The third column excludes households
who extract equity to finance home improvements. The result in this column is identical to that in the first
78
column. Finally, the fourth column shows the interaction of changes to house value with the indicator for being
highly levered. Here, the consumption response does not depend on leverage, in contrast to the results from
the left-hand half of the table.
Table A4: Panel Evidence for House Price Effects from the BHPS





** 0.084** 0.037** 0.046*** -0.019 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.015) (0.016)
ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡−1 ×Δ(log(𝑝𝐻𝑡 𝐻𝑡)) 0.320* 0.004
(0.194) (0.032)
no home improvement x x x x
year effects x x x x x x
movers x
Observations 17707 17707 17707 23025 1258 22043 23025
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis. 𝑀𝑡 is (unlogged) mortgage level. 𝑓𝑡 is log
residual food expenditure. ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡 is an indicator that the mortgage-to-house-value ratio is greater than 70%.
Re-mortgaging regressions exclude those aged over 55 and include a quadratic in age as an extra control. Food
expenditure regressions include changes to income as an extra control. See text for more details.
Appendix References
References
Berger, D., V. Guerrieri, G. Lorenzoni, and J. Vavra (2018): “House Prices and Consumer Spending,”
Review of Economic Studies, 85, 1502–1542.
Blundell, R., H. Low, and I. Preston (2013): “Decomposing Changes in Income Risk Using Consumption
Data,”Quantitative Economics, 4, 1–37.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Saporta-Eksten (2016): “Consumption inequality and family labor
supply,”American Economic Review, 106, 387–435.
Bohrnstedt, G. W. and A. S. Goldberger (1969): “On the exact covariance of products of random
variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 64, 1439–1442.
Campbell, J. and J. Cocco (2007): “How do house prices affect consumption? Evidence from micro data,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 591–621.
79
Clausen, A. and C. Strub (2013): “Envelope Theorems for Non-Smooth and Non-Concave Optimization,”
Mimeo.
Crossley, T., P. Levell, and H. Low (2017): “Consumption Spending, Housing Investments and the Role
of Leverage,”mimeo.
Disney, R., J. Gathergood, and A. Henley (2010): “House price shocks, negative equity, and household
consumption in the united kingdom,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 1179–1207.
Fella, G. (2014): “A generalized endogenous grid method for non-smooth and non-concave problems,”Review
of Economic Dynamics, 17, 329–344.
Goodman, L. (1960): “On the exact variance of products,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
55, 708–713.
Iskhakov, F., T. Jorgensen, J. Rust, and B. Schjerning (2017): “The Endogenous Grid Method For
Discrete-Continuous Choice Dynamic Models With (or Without) Taste Shocks,”Quantitative Economics, 8,
317–365.
Piazzesi, M. and M. Schneider (2016): “Housing and Macroeconomics,” Handbook of Macroeconomics:
Volume 2.
Wooldridge, J. (2002): Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT Press.
80
